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ABSTRACT
Smartphones are pervasive nowadays. They are supported by mobile platforms that
allow users to download and run feature-rich mobile applications (apps). While mobile
apps help users conveniently process personal data on mobile devices, they also pose
security and privacy threats and put user’s data at risk. Even though modern mobile
platforms such as Android have integrated security mechanisms to protect users, most
mechanisms do not easily adapt to user’s security requirements and rapidly evolving
threats. They either fail to provide sufficient intelligence for a user to make informed
security decisions, or require great sophistication to configure the mechanisms for
enforcing security decisions. These limitations lead to a situation where users are
disadvantageous against emerging malware on modern mobile platforms. To remedy
this situation, I propose automated and systematic approaches to address three secu-
rity management tasks: monitoring, assessment, and confinement of mobile apps. In
particular, monitoring apps helps a user observe and record apps’ runtime behaviors
as controlled under security mechanisms. Automated assessment distills intelligence
from the observed behaviors and the security configurations of security mechanisms.
The distilled intelligence further fuels enhanced confinement mechanisms that flexi-
bly and accurately shape apps’ behaviors. To demonstrate the feasibility of my ap-
proaches, I design and implement a suite of proof-of-concept prototypes that support
the three tasks respectively.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Modern mobile platforms, such as Apple iOS and Google Android, have evolved sig-
nificantly to support a computing paradigm that is different from those supported
by desktop platforms. Today’s mobile devices are always connected to the Internet
thanks to the prevalence of 3G/4G cellular networks. Meanwhile, they generate local
contexts derived from a collection of sensors such as microphones, cameras, GPS re-
ceivers, gyroscopes, and accelerometers. Mobile apps digest the contexts and provide
persistent and personalized services to users. Application stores, as an integral part
of modern mobile platforms, provide central and trusted app distribution channels
through which users can discover and purchase apps. The possibilities enabled by
modern mobile platforms lead to an explosive growth of feature-rich apps that stores
and processes user’s sensitive information.
As mobile devices are rich of sensitive data, they also become an appealing target
for adversaries. Android malware has increased by 600% to a total of more than
6M pieces from 2013 to 2014 [16]. These malware steals almost everything stored
on mobile devices, including photos, messages, browsing histories, banking accounts,
and two-factor authentication tokens. There is even evidence showing that recent
Android malware is “mutating and getting smarter” [16]. In 2013, Sophos reported
sophisticated malware strains that employ heavy obfuscation, encryption, and poly-
morphism techniques to resist detection and analysis. The security community also
reported malware samples that are able to detect the presence of emulators and hide
themselves from emulator-based screening tools deployed at application stores [47, 57].
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To protect users against adversaries, modern mobile platforms implement sand-
boxes and permissions. A sandbox enforces a fixed set of default rules and isolates an
app’s data and code in a unique and small protection domain, so that the app’s capa-
bilities are confined and minimized to accessing its own files and security-insensitive
APIs. However, apps inevitably communicate with other apps and the mobile OS.
Therefore, a user can explicitly grant permissions to an app so that the app can ac-
cess resources outside its own sandbox. The concept of permission is widely adopted
in modern mobile platforms. For example, iOS uses the name “entitlements,” and
Windows Phone uses “requirements.”
The problem of these security mechanisms is that they rely on the user to evaluate
the security and privacy implications of apps, but are too complex for users to take
actions. Before installing an app, a user only sees the app’s meta information, such
as the description of the app and/or a list of permissions requested by the app. Note
that it is the app’s developers who specify such meta information; and they may lie
or hide their true purpose. Even after installing the app, the user only see the app’s
interface and limited visual hints from the mobile OS, while the background behaviors
of the app are invisible. As a result, it remains a crushing burden for users to assess
an app and to tame the app to do only what the user expects it to do. The burden
comes from both the sophistication required to understand the internals of mobile OSs
and the consistent attention required to address rapidly evolving apps and threats.
Moreover, apps do not run by themselves; an app’s behaviors are also shaped by its
communication from and to other apps, which further stacks up the complexities in
taming apps. And failing to address inter-application communication could lead to
data leaks and privilege escalation attacks. In summary, the limitations of existing
security mechanisms in modern mobile platforms render users disadvantageous with
respect to protecting themselves against rogue apps.
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Figure 1.1: Problem Space of Mobile Platform Security
1.1 Thesis Statement
The security situation on modern mobile platforms is dire. While the adversaries
are getting smarter, the users expect to regain control of the mobile devices and they
demand more power to inspect and tame apps. The discoveries and observations made
during our studies of modern mobile platforms inform the following thesis statement:
Modern mobile platforms need systematic and automated approaches to
monitor, assess, and confine the behaviors of mobile applications.
In this dissertation, we focus on the Android platform because it is one of the
most representative modern mobile platforms and it provides the necessary openness
of documentation and platform source code that facilitate our analysis, modifications,
and experiments. Figure 1.1 depicts the problem space of Android system security
and where monitoring, assessment, and confinement fit in the space. Specifically, we
propose to monitoring apps interactions with other apps and the mobile OS to acquire
the intelligence about apps’ actual purpose. We further propose assessment mecha-
nisms to help users better digest the collected intelligence, make informed security
decisions and, verify the effectiveness of the decisions. Finally we propose confine-
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ment mechanisms to flexibly enforce the security decisions. The three tasks constitute
a security management lifecycle that can be applied continuously and iteratively to
address emerging threats and rapidly evolving mobile apps.
Evidence of each task can be found in our subsequent studies. In our first study,
we attempt to understand the limitations of the current monitoring and confinement
mechanisms and exploit these limitations for attacks. In particular, we systemati-
cally generate a set of heuristics that allow malware to evade emulator-based dynamic
analysis. Based on the discovered limitations, our second study proposes enhanced
monitoring and confinement mechanisms. We propose a suite of three comprehensive
reference monitors that mediate app-to-app and app-to-OS communication at three
respective layers of Android. Our third study implements an automated risk assess-
ment framework. It evaluates each individual app’s security risk with an automati-
cally generated risk assessment baseline derived from a user’s security requirements
and the user’s trusted apps’ runtime behaviors. The final study goes beyond individ-
ual apps and assesses inter-application communication. We propose a generic intent
space model and an automated policy checker to assess intent-based inter-application
communication that is controlled by multiple incompatible security mechanisms.
1.2 Previous Publications
This dissertation incorporates materials from my previous conference and jour-
nal papers. The concepts and techniques of attacking the loopholes of the existing
monitoring and confinement mechanisms in Chapter 3 were discussed in the following
conference paper:
• Yiming Jing, Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu, Morpheus: Auto-
matically generating heuristics to detect android emulators. In Proceedings of
the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2014.
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The system for comprehensively monitoring and confining app’s runtime behav-
iors in Chapter 4 was discussed in the following journal paper that is currently in
submission.
• Yiming Jing, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu, TripleMon: A multi-layer se-
curity framework for mediating inter-process communication on android. In
submission to Journal of Computers and Security, Elsevier, 2015.
The ideas of a risk assessment framework for individual apps and a holistic policy
checking framework for inter-application communication were discussed in two confer-
ence papers, a journal paper, and a conference paper that is currently in submission.
• Yiming Jing, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu, Model-based conformance test-
ing for android. In Proceeding of the 7th International Workshop on Security
(IWSEC), Springer, 2012.
• Yiming Jing, Gail-Joon Ahn, Ziming Zhao, and Hongxin Hu, RiskMon: Contin-
uous and automated risk assessment of mobile applications. In Proceedings of
the 4th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CO-
DASPY), ACM, 2014. (Best Paper Award)
• Yiming Jing, Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Hongxin Hu, Towards auto-
mated risk assessment and mitigation of mobile applications. In IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE, 2015.
• Yiming Jing, Adam Doupe´, Gail-Joon Ahn, Checking Intent-based Communi-
cation in Android with Intent Space Analysis. In submission to the 6th ACM
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, 2016.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter gives a brief introduction about the Android platform that facilitates
understanding of the remaining chapters.
2.1 Android Fundamentals
Android is a mobile platform that consists of a monolithic Linux kernel and a
loosely-coupled middleware layer. An app can use functionalities provided by both
the middleware and Linux. The basic building blocks of Android apps are compo-
nents. Android defines four types of components to address different requirements
and scenarios 1 .
• Activities are components that provide graphic user interfaces (GUI). The An-
droid GUI is implemented as a stack of activities starting one after another,
where each activity is typically presented as a window on the screen.
• Services are components that run in the background for long-running opera-
tions. They expose remote procedure call (RPC) interfaces to be called by
other apps.
• Broadcast Receivers are components that asynchronously receive broadcasts sent
from other components.
• Content Providers are components that provide public data interfaces to other
components. A content provider supports common database operations such as
query, insert, update and delete.
1http://developer.android.com/guide/components/index.html
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A component can be exported to other apps. Each exported component of an app
is an entry point for intents through which the other apps or the Android system can
send intents. Typically, an app exports its components to other apps by statically
declaring the exports in the app’s manifest. However, an app can also dynamically
create and export components in its code. Two system services, PackageManagerSer-
vice (PMS) and ActivityManagerService (AMS), maintain the information about each
installed app’s components regardless of how the components are exported—either
statically or dynamically.
2.2 Inter-Application Communication in Android
The sandbox in Android mediates apps’ accesses on resources and isolates an
app’s data and code execution from other apps. It disallows an app to directly access
the data outside its sandbox. Instead, it allows the app to send data requests to
other apps and system services through inter-process communication (IPC) channels.
In this section, we briefly describe the major types of Android IPC mechanisms.
Figure 2.1 shows the examples of these IPC channels in Android. On the top of the
figure we show the data owned by apps and system services. The sandboxed apps
and system services are listed in the middle. The arrows demonstrate data requests
sent by apps via IPC mechanisms. Next, we describe the IPC mechanisms and their
corresponding examples in the figure.
2.2.1 Intent-based Inter-Component Communication
Intent play a leading role in connecting the components of apps. An app creates an
intent and sets its embedded attributes. The intent is then processed by the Android
system and the security extensions, which automatically resolve an intent’s recipients
based on the following intent attributes:
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Figure 2.1: Examples of Android Inter-Process Communication
• Component name: This attribute explicitly specifies the expected recipient
of the intent.
• Action: This attribute describes the general action to be taken by a recipient
component, such as PICK, VIEW, EDIT, or SHARE.
• Scheme: This attribute describes the protocol that serves the data, such as
http, mailto, or tel.
• Authority: This attribute describes the location of the data, such as www.google.com
or paypal.
• Type: This attribute describes the MIME type of the data, such as audio/ogg,
video/*, or */*. Note that wildcards are allowed.
• Category: This attribute provides additional information about the data. For
example, a category BROWSABLE implies the data that can be opened in a web
browser, such as a link to an image.
Two types of intents exist in Android. Explicit intents specify the component name
only. Android delivers an explicit intent directly to its specified component regardless
of the presence of any other attributes. Implicit intents specify the attributes other
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than component name. Thus, an implicit intent’s recipients are implicit and must be
resolved at intent-sending time; Android must search the registered components to
resolve the recipient components.
Out of all the existing security extensions that control intents, four security ex-
tensions are part of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) and ship with almost
every recent Android device. Intent filters assigned on an app’s component specify
the implicit intents that the component can receive. Each filter corresponds to only
one component, while a component can have multiple filters. An intent filter describes
its accepted intents with the same attributes as those of implicit intents. Permissions
further constrain an app from receiving explicit and implicit intents. Specifically, a
permission assigned on a component requires the component to only receive intents
from the apps that hold the same permission. Protected broadcasts are a set of special
implicit intents reserved by the Android framework and system apps; they cannot be
sent from any third-party apps. In addition, IntentFirewall enables policy-driven
access control over both types of intents. It denies specific apps from sending certain
intents as specified in its policy, which can be defined by users or enterprise IT. Over-
all, an intent is processed by one security extension after another before it reaches
any recipient component. As shown in Figure 2.1, App B and App C utilize ICC
to communicate with each other. The arrows show that App B sends an intent to
App C via AMS.
2.2.2 Binder IPC
Although the sandbox prevents an app from directly accessing anything outside
its sandbox, it allows the app to interact with system services via Android APIs which
are implemented based on an IPC framework called Binder. Binder includes proxies
implemented as parts of the app framework, stubs implemented as parts of system
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services, and a kernel module to manage Binder IPC transactions. The kernel module
identifies IPC transactions with the user IDs and process IDs of sender and recipient
processes as well as a command code that specifies the action to be performed by the
receipt process.
A typical Binder IPC channel is established with 6 steps: (1) an app invokes
the proxy that encapsulates the destination system service’s Binder IPC handle, a
command code, and optional data in a parcel; (2) Binder resolves the destination using
the IPC handle; (3) Binder delivers the parcel and invokes the stub in the destination
system service; (5) the stub unpacks the parcel, takes the action as instructed by
the command code, and sends results back to the proxy via Binder; and (6) the app
receives the results. As depicted in Figure 2.1, App E can use the camera via the
CameraManagerProxy of the app framework. As of this writing, Binder IPC is solely
controlled by a kernel-based Mandatory Access Control (MAC) implementation called
SEAndroid [109].
2.2.3 Linux IPC
Traditional Linux IPC is still available in Android. Examples include local sock-
ets, Unix-domain sockets, and Netlink sockets. In a broader sense, Linux IPC also
includes communication via signals and files. System services may use Linux IPC to
communicate with other services and the kernel. Note that apps may also use Linux
IPC, which allows them to bypass the Android middleware. Recent attacks [124, 125]
have demonstrated the feasibility of exploiting such IPC channels. Figure 2.1 shows
that MountService communicates with Volume Daemon (vold) through a local socket.
In addition, vold exposes a Netlink socket to receive events (e.g., unplugging storage
media) from the kernel. Similar to Binder IPC, Linux IPC mechanisms are mediated
by SEAndroid [109].
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2.3 Prominent Threats
Android includes a monolithic Linux kernel and a loosely-coupled middleware
layer. Due to the mixed nature of this platform, Android not only inherits security
issues rooted in the Linux kernel, but also faces unique security problems introduced
by the middleware.
2.3.1 Attacks Bypassing the Sandbox
Before Android 4.2, the Android sandbox is based the discretionary access control
(DAC) provided in Linux kernels by default. Files that are set globally accessible
render the DAC-based sandbox useless. For example, a vulnerability in Skype ex-
poses the user’s profile and messages to every installed app [7]. Similarly, a file that
stores the list of installed apps is mistakenly set globally readable in early Android
versions [68].
Linux kernel vulnerabilities also make it possible to bypass the sandbox [1, 2, 6,
8, 9, 12]. These exploits (also known as “jailbreaks”) allow an app to escalate their
privilege to root privileges. Recent reports have shown cases of root-capable apps
that download additional malware [14] and replace system binaries [13]. Indeed, the
occurrence of such exploits is quite high [126], and almost every popular Android
device had a publicly available exploit for at least 74% of the device’s lifetime [59].
2.3.2 Attacks Bypassing Permissions
As apps may unintentionally expose private components, ICC can be abused for
unauthorized intent receipt and intent spoofing [42]. For example, a malicious app
can sniff, modify, and replace messages sent by a benign app. Moreover, Lineberry et
al. show that a zero-permission app may upload without the INTERNET permission by
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sending an intent to the Browser app [5]. Several similar zero-permission attacks have
been discovered as well, such as making phone calls [56] and setting an alarm [60].
A coarse-grained permission covers multiple capabilities for accessing resources
with different sensitivity levels. For example, READ PHONE STATE allows an app to
access both the phone’s state (e.g., if there is an incoming call) and unique device
identifiers [51]. The former is trivial but the latter introduces potential privacy risks.
For apps that utilize the phone’s state only, holding unnecessary capabilities such
as reading the identifiers violates the security principle of least privilege. In addi-
tion, permissions are indivisible and irrevocable. A user has no way to control each
individual capability covered by a single permission.
Finally, some sensitive APIs are not well-protected. For example, the RingerMode
setting of AudioService is not protected by any permission, allowing any app to silence
the phone without the user’s consent. Felt et al. point out that only 6.45% of all API
methods in Android are protected by at least one permission [58].
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Chapter 3
MONITORING AND CONFINEMENT: ATTACKS
This work analyzes the limitations of existing security mechanisms in Android and
attempts to exploit the limitations. We found that apps are over-privileged despite
being confined. The excessive privileges allow an app to sense the presence of Android
emulators and thus make it possible to evade emulator-based dynamic analysis. In this
work, we propose a systematical approach to exploit these privileges and to discover
heuristics to detect Android emulators. Our approach and preliminary results are
published in [80].
3.1 Problem Statement
The rise of mobile computing should partially give credit to application stores such
as Apple AppStore and Google Play. With these services, users enjoy a centralized and
trusted source for browsing and purchasing apps. Unfortunately, such advantages also
make application stores an appealing place for distributing malicious mobile apps. To
infect more unsuspecting users, adversaries would attempt to publish their malware
in application stores without being detected. To effectively mitigate such attempts,
the application stores have deployed emulator-based dynamic analysis, which vets
runtime behaviors of apps on a large scale.
However, a flaw of emulator-based dynamic analysis lies in the discrepancies be-
tween emulators and real devices. Such discrepancies, if observable by apps, may
lead to detection heuristics (a.k.a., “red pills”) that indicate the fabricated reality of
Android emulators. Taking advantage of these heuristics, Android malware can build
split personalities and circumvent dynamic analysis. For example, a malicious app
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could stay dormant or exhibit legitimate behaviors. Furthermore, this app can use
dynamic external code loading to evade both static and dynamic analysis, because it
only downloads the malicious payload when it is in a real device. Alternatively, it can
perform reconnaissance within the emulator and phone home to facilitate generation
of up-to-date detection heuristics for future attacks. Indeed, the security community
has already discovered Android malware samples that use such heuristics to evade
dynamic analysis.
Due to the peculiarities of Android, we argue that Android malware would be
reluctant to reuse previous PC emulator detection heuristics. First, Android mal-
ware faces a unified runtime environment whose underlying implementation details
(e.g., hardware differences) are concealed by the Android middleware and APIs. At
the same time, Android malware has been deprived of many capabilities that allow
accessing low-level system artifacts by the Android application sandbox. In addi-
tion, Android malware would prefer detection heuristics implemented with Java code
rather than native code. As native code is used by only a small fraction of benign An-
droid apps but most malicious root exploits [128], native code would draw attention
of analysis tools, breaking a detection heuristic’s basic purpose of evading analysis.
The detection heuristics found in newly discovered malware samples seem to be
in line with our argument. They allow an app to detect emulators without bypassing
the application sandbox and without the assistance of native code. For example, a
popular detection heuristic involves an Android API getDeviceId that returns the
IMEI of an Android device. This heuristic calls getDeviceId and tests whether
“000000000000000” is a substring of the returned value of getDeviceId. It can
be implemented with only two lines of Java code and thus leaves relatively small
footprints. Despite that researchers have discovered similar detection heuristics and
evaluated their effectiveness against Android SDK emulators, the magnitude and
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accuracy of such heuristics remain unknown, which results in an impediment to the
development of comprehensive countermeasures.
Regrettably, all known detection heuristics that target Android emulators are
discovered piece by piece in an ad-hoc fashion. For example, some heuristics are
discovered through dissecting malware samples [47, 57]. Such a reactive approach
cannot predict unknown heuristics. Other known heuristics are derived from manual
analysis on specific components of Android emulators [88, 112]. Even though this
approach is proactive, manual analysis inevitably cannot address the multitude of
components in Android emulators.
3.2 A Proactive and Automated Approach to Generate Heuristics
In our threat model, we assume emulators that run Android with default config-
urations. We also assume the presence of passive anti-detection techniques, which
do not proactively instrument the application to suppress the execution of detection
heuristics. This is also the common setup of the existing deployed emulator-based
dynamic analysis systems.
In addition, we assume a malicious Android application that does not bypass the
application sandbox or carry any native code. Meanwhile, we allow this application
to request any Android permission. granted. In other words, this application’s ca-
pabilities are no more than those of the benign applications in application stores.
Afterwards, it applies detection heuristics that check the presence or contents of cer-
tain artifacts. Based on the result, it determines where it is running.
As the app is properly confined, it cannot exploit the artifacts that it cannot
observe from within the application sandbox. Here we define observable artifacts as
artifacts (e.g., files, APIs) whose presence can be probed or whose contents can be
read by any Android application in its sandbox. For example, suppose a file is not
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Figure 3.1: Proposed Heuristic Generation Framework
readable but its parent directory is listable, this file is still an observable artifact.
Leveraging this observation, the key of this work is to retrieve and analyze observable
artifacts and verify whether they can be used to indicate emulators.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, our framework would consist of four components. The
sandbox analyzer analyzes the default configurations of the Android application sand-
box to identify sources of observable artifacts. For respective sources, the artifact
retriever enumerates observable artifacts and retrieves their contents. The retrieved
observable artifacts are uploaded to two pools for both emulators and real devices,
respectively. The heuristic extractor then analyzes the pools by finding the artifacts
or substrings of their contents that appear in most emulators but a small fraction
of real devices, and vice versa. These artifacts and substrings constitute candidate
detection heuristics. Finally, the heuristic selector ranks the candidates.
3.2.1 Sandbox Analyzer
Applications’ accesses on artifacts are regulated by the Android application sand-
box, which is based on discretionary and mandatory access control (DAC and MAC).
The Linux kernel provides DAC, which grants accesses by checking permissions of
objects. Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) adds MAC over DAC starting from An-
droid 4.3. SELinux grants accesses by checking domains of subjects (e.g., untrusted app),
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types of objects (e.g., wallpaper files), and SELinux permissions (e.g., open, read,
ioctl, recv msg) 1 .
To identify sources of observable artifacts, we need to access all the objects in the
Android OS. However, it is infeasible to do so in off-the-shelf Android devices due to
the application sandbox and lack of root privileges. Instead, we propose the sand-
box analyzer that analyzes the reference SELinux policy in Android and the security
attributes (e.g., owners, permissions, xattr) of objects in rooted reference Android
devices (e.g., Nexus devices). Specifically, we attempt to identify the objects whose
security attributes expose themselves to third-party applications. Given that third-
party applications are automatically assigned into the untrusted app domain during
installation, we simulate DAC and MAC checks to identify the following objects:
(1) objects that are world-readable or under world-listable directories; and (2) ob-
jects that are accessible by untrusted app using read-like SELinux permissions (e.g.,
read, recv msg, ioctl). From such objects, we then distill the sources of observable
artifacts based on their owners and SELinux types, along with proper methods to
retrieve them. For example, /dev/binder has the SELinux type binder device. Its
SELinux type indicates that it belongs to the Binder IPC subsystem that allows an
application to access remote artifacts in system services. Such artifacts would require
Binder-specific methods to retrieve. As variations in the hierarchy of objects across
different Android versions are insignificant, the sources of observable artifacts derived
from the reference inputs should be applicable in emulators and real devices.
We stress that the sandbox analyzer is much more conservative compared with the
current Android application sandbox. SELinux in Android 4.3 is configured to permit
every access. Even in Android 4.4, SELinux only protects several critical system
1We ignore users, roles, and security levels for brevity because they are rarely used in the context
of Android.
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daemons and does not confine third-party applications (i.e., untrusted apps). With
that said, the true amount of observable artifacts in current Android devices could
be much larger. However, considering the possibility that SELinux may extend its
coverage in the upcoming versions of Android, we choose to be conservative for the
future effectiveness of our detection heuristics.
3.2.2 Artifact Retriever
The artifact retriever is essentially a probe application. It requests all the avail-
able Android permissions to maximize its capabilities within the confinement of the
application sandbox. Based on the identified sources of observable artifacts, we im-
plement the corresponding methods in the artifact retriever to automatically retrieve
the observable artifacts as well as their contents.
To address the various sources of observable artifacts, we propose three founda-
tion modules in the artifact retriever: a directory walker, a Java function caller, and
a Binder IPC caller. They are tailored to the peculiarity of Android and can be
easily adapted and combined. Specifically, the directory walker traverses file-like ar-
tifacts. The Java function caller enumerates and manipulates both public and hidden
Android APIs. The Binder IPC caller directly triggers remote system services (e.g.,
TelephonyManagerService) with dynamically constructed Binder IPC messages.
We launch the artifact retriever into both Android emulators and real devices. It
probes the surrounding observable artifacts with its carried modules. It technically
captures the first 1KB of each artifact’s contents if readable. Upon explicit errors
(e.g., denied access), it records the error messages as the retrieved contents. Upon
implicit errors (e.g., blocking read), it uses a timeout to ensure that it does not
hang there infinitely. We note that, the artifact retriever must upload artifacts to
the correct pool according to where the artifacts are observed. For example, artifacts
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collected from emulators should never go into D-Pool. This is critical for the heuristic
extractor to work effectively, because arbitrary noises could make the problem of
heuristic generation NP-hard [86].
3.2.3 Heuristic Extractor
The inputs of the heuristic extractor are two pools, namely E-Pool and D-Pool,
which contain instances of observed emulators and real devices, respectively. Each
instance is a collection of key-value pairs that map retrieved artifacts to their contents.
A key (artifact) occurs in an instance once at most, although it can occur in multiple
instances. And a value (content) can be null if the artifact retriever fails to read
the contents. Next, we describe two categories of detection heuristics that generate
decisions based on the artifacts and their contents, respectively.
We start from a category of heuristics that make decisions based on the presence
of artifacts. First, we attempt to discover the artifacts that are exclusively used
by emulators, such as emulator-specific hardware, software, and configurations. As
we use their presence to imply emulators, we refer to them as Type E artifacts.
Furthermore, we also look for the artifacts that appear in most real devices, which
become our Type D artifacts.
We propose two metrics, COVE(a) and COVD(a) to denote the fractions of in-
stances in E-Pool or D-Pool that contain artifact a, i.e., COVE(a) =
|Ea|
|E|
, and
COVD(a) =
|Da|
|D|
. Intuitively, our heuristics should at least perform better than a
50/50 guess. Thus, we choose Type E and Type D artifacts from all the artifacts in
both pools according to their values of COVE(a) and COVD(a) as follows:
• Type E artifacts: COVE > 50%, COVD < 50%
• Type D artifacts: COVE < 50%, COVD > 50%
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However, there are plenty of artifacts that are prevalent in both emulators and
real devices. For example, Android APIs would have both COVE and COVD larger
than 50%. Inspired by Hamsa [86], we propose a category of detection heuristics
whose decisions are based on tokens, where token is a contiguous byte subsequence in
the contents of an artifact. Similar to what we introduce for artifact-based heuristics,
we attempt to find Type E and Type D tokens.
Specifically, for an artifact a and its retrieved contents in E-Pool, we extract a
set of tokens by computing common substrings among the contents. We then extract
another set of tokens for D-Pool. Combining these two sets of tokens as a token set
T , we compute COVE(a, t) and COVD(a, t), which are the fractions of instances in E-
Pool and D-Pool whose contents of artifact a contain token t, i.e., COVE(a, t) =
|Ea,t|
|E|
and COVD(t) =
|Da,t|
|D|
. Based on the values of COVE(a, t) and COVD(a, t), we select
two type of tokens as our content-based heuristics as follows:
• Type E tokens: COVE > 50%, COVD < 50%
• Type D tokens: COVE < 50%, COVD > 50%
There are various algorithms that effectively compute common substrings. We
opt for a suffix array in our heuristic extractor. Constructing a suffix array runs in
O(nlogn) time in worst case scenario and consumes 5n bytes of memory, where n is
the total size of the contents of an artifact in a pool. Extracting tokens from the
constructed suffix array can be implemented using a binary search. Furthermore, as
we prefer longer tokens in the context of generating detection heuristics, we add one
more step to prune tokens that are substrings of the other tokens as long as they
share the same COVE and COVD.
The output of the heuristic extractor is a set of Type E and Type D heuristics.
Each heuristic is represented as a 3-tuple (artifact, token, type). token can be null
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for artifact-based heuristics. type implies the decision to be made once the observed
artifact/token matches the artifact/token specified in the heuristic. The matched
Type E heuristics indicate emulators and the unmatched ones indicate real devices.
Conversely, Type D heuristics imply the opposite decision.
3.2.4 Heuristic Selector
We propose the heuristic selector to rank the candidate detection heuristics gen-
erated by the heuristic extractor. In general, we reduce the problem of ranking the
candidates to the problem of feature selection in supervised learning. E-Pool and
D-Pool comprise a training set consisted of instances that are correctly labeled with
“emulator” or “real device.” Furthermore, we have extracted a set of detection heuris-
tics that can be considered as binary features. Now we need to select the relevant
and non-redundant detection heuristics that would best classify future observations.
We propose to use a random forest [74], which is an ensemble learning method
that leverages a multitude of decision trees for classification. Each individual decision
tree covers a random subset of the features and is trained with a random subset of
training samples. Afterwards, the random forest fits the training set by letting each
decision tree predict its unseen samples and evaluate the errors. During this process,
an importance score for each feature is measured based on how significant the error
rate would change if the feature is removed from the decision trees.
We use this importance score as a metric to rank the candidate heuristics. On one
hand, relevant heuristics that contribute much to classification naturally get higher
importance scores. On the other hand, redundant heuristics that exploit the same
artifact/token as other heuristics are assigned zero or lower importance scores. As
such, the final output of the heuristic selector is a set of relevant and non-redundant
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detection heuristics as sorted by their importance scores derived from the random
forest.
As the number of detection heuristics is much larger than the number of instances
in the pools, the random forest may suffer from over-fitting, which overestimates the
importance level of some heuristics. To suppress over-fitting, we choose to increase
the number of decision trees in the random forest. As more trees are added, its
tendency to over-fit generally decreases as no single feature can affect every decision
tree.
3.3 Finding Detection Heuristics
We ran our experiments with Morpheus against QEMU-based Android SDK em-
ulators [17], VirtualBox-based Genymotion emulators [19], and real devices. In this
section, we elaborate our experiments that lead to the findings of 10,632 detection
heuristics. We then characterize the heuristics according to the underlying discrep-
ancies that they exploit.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup and Findings
To understand the observable artifacts in the reference Android devices, we adopted
an instance of the SDK emulator and a Galaxy Nexus phone that both run Android
4.4. We traversed their mounted file systems to obtain the security attributes of
objects. We then acquired a copy of the default SELinux policy from the Android
Open Source Project (AOSP). Using these as inputs, the sandbox analyzer identified
33 sources of observable artifacts. However, retrieving all of them requires plenty of
domain-specific knowledge for tasks such as enumerating artifacts and constructing
valid inputs. In this work, we only retrieved 3 sources that could possibly lead to
discrepancies and cover a sufficient number of observable artifacts.
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Procfs and Sysfs: Procfs and sysfs are both pseudo file systems that expose
kernel objects to userspace programs. Specifically, procfs presents system informa-
tion, such as loaded kernel modules, mounted filesystems, and network stacks. Sysfs
exports hardware information such as connected block devices, buses, and power
states. Our implementation of the artifact retriever traversed these two file systems
mounted at /proc and /sys. In particular, we slightly adapted the directory walker
to handle looped symbolic links that are prevalent in procfs and sysfs.
Android APIs: A large number public and hidden APIs are exposed by Android
system services. For example, TelephonyManagerService exposes APIs that return
unique device identifiers to applications. Actually, the APIs are implemented with
the underlying Binder IPC framework, which handles the IPC between applications
and system services through a Binder device node located at /dev/binder.
To probe APIs behind Binder, we implemented two approaches in the artifact
retriever. We used the reflection-based Java function caller to enumerate and call
APIs. We also adapted the Binder IPC caller to construct and send IPC messages
to the remote system services. The returned Java objects and Binder IPC messages
were converted into byte sequences as the retrieved artifacts’ contents. For Java
objects that are not of Java primitive types, we leveraged their toString method to
acquire more information about them. In this chapter, we are particularly interested
in Android APIs that do not have any input parameters. According to [102], such
APIs are more likely to be “sources that return non-constant values into application
code.” As a result, we covered approximately 15% of the 1,326 APIs exposed by
Android system services.
Android System Properties: Similar to the Windows registry, Android in-
cludes a subsystem that centrally stores system configurations and status. This sub-
system, usually dubbed as “property system,” has been extensively used by Android
23
system services. For example, a system property ro.kernel.qemu is read by the
Android debugging bridge daemon (adbd) to determine the presence of emulators.
System properties also cover meta information about the hardware, such as device
models and manufacturers. Despite that SELinux in Android protects system prop-
erties, we inspected the implementation of the property system and found that the
security check is only in the function property set(), meaning that SELinux does
not prevent reading system properties at all. Moreover, applications are allowed to
read /dev/ properties , which is the interface to system properties. Therefore,
system properties are observable by every installed application. To retrieve system
properties, we adapted the artifact retriever to call a binary executable located at
/system/bin/getprop. It enumerates system properties so that the Java function
caller can read the contents of each property. We note that this executable is only for
the artifact retriever. It is not required by the detection heuristics that read system
properties.
Afterward, we ran the adapted artifact retriever against 16 instances of QEMU-
based SDK emulators, 11 instances of VirtualBox-based Genymotion emulators, and
25 real devices. The SDK emulators covered three CPU architectures, namely ARM,
x86, and MIPS. The Genymotion emulators covered x86, which is the only architec-
ture they support. Both emulator types covered Android versions from 2.3 to 4.4. The
real devices covered four manufacturers (Samsung, HTC, Motorola, and LGE), three
ARM SoC families (Qualcomm Snapdragon, Texas Instruments OMAP, and Nvidia
Tegra), and Android versions from 2.1 to 4.4. In particular, the real devices were bor-
rowed from the participants we recruited through university mailing lists under the
study protocol reviewed by our institution’s IRB. Anecdotally, it took approximately
5-20 minutes for the artifact retriever to retrieve and upload the observable artifacts
on each device.
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Table 3.1: Discovered Detection Heuristics
Pools
Detection Heuristics
File API Property Total
D-Pool + E-Pool 2,121 81 82 2,284
D-Pool + EQ-Pool 2,961 163 132 3,256
D-Pool + EV -Pool 4,782 150 160 5,092
Total 9,864 394 374 10,632
The retrieved artifacts contributed to four pools for QEMU-based emulators (EQ-
Pool), VirtualBox-based emulators (EV -Pool), all the emulators (E-Pool), and real
devices (D-Pool). We then fed these pools to the heuristic extractor and the heuristic
selector. The heuristic selector ranked the candidate heuristics with 10,000 decision
trees and pruned the heuristics with zero importance scores. Table 3.1 shows a break-
down of the discovered 10,632 detection heuristics. In the remainder of this chapter,
we will respectively refer to these three categories of heuristics as file heuristics, API
heuristics, and property heuristics, in the interest of brevity.
3.3.2 Characterizing Detection Heuristics
Next, we characterize the discovered heuristics based on the discrepancies they
exploit. We first discuss the common detection heuristics that exploit the discrepan-
cies shared by both QEMU-based and VirtualBox-based emulators. We then discuss
the heuristics that leverage the QEMU-specific or VirtualBox-specific discrepancies,
respectively. Our discussion does not aim to be exhaustive, instead we attempt to
convey the scope of discrepancies in Android emulators. Considering that an at-
tacker can possibly use this section as hints to craft detection heuristics, we suggest
provisional but deployable countermeasures in Section 3.5.
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Common Detection Heuristics
Network. These detection heuristics exploit the discrepancies in network interfaces,
Netfilter modules, and kernel modules. For example, we found that all the emulators
exclusively use eth0, whereas the real devices use wlan0 and rmnet. The emulators
also miss several IPv6-specific interfaces. In addition, the network interfaces in the
emulators are not tetherable, because the emulators are missing the Remote Network
Driver Interface (RNDIS) drivers that enable tethering. Netfilter is another source of
discrepancies. The real devices include Netfilter modules for several network protocols
that are rarely used in the context of mobile devices. Finally, Android introduces a
kernel module to track data usage of installed applications. This module does not
exist in the emulators.
Power management. This type of heuristics focuses on the power management
subsystem. For example, the emulators lack the voltage and current regulators. The
emulated CPU does not support frequency scaling. Another heuristic lies in the
prevalence of multi-core CPUs in real devices. All the emulators only have a single
core, whereas 75% of the real devices have at least two cores.
Audio. A handy feature of Android is headset detection, which allows the
audio output to automatically switch between speakers and headsets. This feature is
supported by GPIO/I2C buses. Notably, the emulators do not emulate these buses,
while 95.6% of the real devices in our experiments have them. Furthermore, the
differences in the implementation of audio subsystems between the emulators and
real devices result in disparate audio drivers.
USB. Recently, USB On-The-Go (OTG) has been widely adopted in popular
Android phones and tablets. It allows mobile devices to act as hosts and control USB
peripherals. Intuitively, the mobile devices have to pre-install corresponding drivers of
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USB peripherals. As a result, we found that the real devices in our experiments carry
drivers for Apple Magic Mouse, joysticks, and external displays. On the contrary, the
emulators do not have such drivers and do not support USB OTG.
Radio. The software-emulated radio can lead to detection heuristics as well. For
instance, the name of the baseband in all the emulators is “unknown.” Moreover, the
emulators use a default reference implementation of the radio interface layer (RIL),
while the real devices typically use customized ones with different names. Similarly,
the phone numbers, voicemail numbers, device serial numbers of the emulators are
also constants and can be fingerprinted.
Software components and configurations. Despite that most of the discov-
ered detection heuristics are related to hardware, we also identified several heuristics
that exploit certain software components and their configurations. For example, the
emulators use unique input methods and search interfaces. Regarding configurations,
a prominent example is the key that signs the Android OS. The emulators use test
keys while the real devices use release keys.
QEMU Detection Heuristics
QEMU. We found various observable artifacts that are part of QEMU. For example,
we found a device node that accelerates the virtual graphics. In addition, there are
several system properties set by QEMU and read by Android system services. An
example is a property that stores the pixel density of virtual screens.
Goldfish virtual hardware. Most existing QEMU-based Android emulators
are built upon a virtual hardware platform called “Goldfish.” This platform introduces
a set of virtual hardware for QEMU to run Android as its guest operating system.
For instance, this set of virtual hardware includes a framebuffer, an audio device,
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and a battery. They are a must for QEMU-based emulators but never appear in real
Android devices.
Bluetooth, NFC, and vibrator. The current QEMU-based emulators do not
support these hardware. Their corresponding Android APIs return null if called from
within the emulators. In particular, the driver of the vibrator is based on a Linux
driver model called timed output, which is also missing from the emulators.
VirtualBox Detection Heuristics
VirtualBox. Similar to QEMU-based emulators, we also found plenty of VirtualBox-
specific artifacts. For example, we found 4 kernel modules that belong to VirtualBox
Guest Additions. As stated in VirtualBox’s documentation, these modules “optimize
the guest operating system for better performance and usability.” However, their
presence also indicates VirtualBox.
PC hardware. As we have discussed, QEMU-based emulators lack support for
some popular hardware, such as Bluetooth and NFC. On the contrary, VirtualBox-
based emulators support many types of hardware that Android does not need. We
found hundreds of artifacts that indicate PC hardware and obviously should not
appear in mobile operating systems. For example, we found artifacts related to ACPI,
CPU fans, thermal sensors, CD-ROM drives, AC97 audio codecs, and PCI Express.
3.4 Measuring Detection Heuristics
As we have demonstrated the magnitude of the detection heuristic for Android
emulators, we further measure their accuracies. To this end, we assembled a group
of the top-ranked detection heuristics which are ranked by the heuristic selector. We
then tested them against emulator-based malware analysis tools and real devices.
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In this section, we describe our experiments along with an empirical study on the
average accuracies.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
As the generated common detection heuristics were already ranked by the heuristic
selector, we selected the top 10 heuristics out of the File, API, and Property detection
heuristics, respectively. Table 3.2 lists the artifacts, tokens, and types of the 30
selected detection heuristics.
We created a synthetic application to simulate the Android malware as we de-
scribed in the threat model. Specifically, this application integrated the 30 heuristics
with a heuristic matching engine based on Java’s substring searching methods. It gen-
erated its decision using a majority vote among the 30 heuristics. In other words, an
Android device is recognized as an emulator if more than half of the detection heuris-
tics indicate so. Furthermore, it only needed four permissions: READ PHONE STATE,
ACCESS NETWORK STATE, ACCESS WIFI STATE, and INTERNET, which are also frequently
requested by benign applications in Google Play [127].
We ran this application in 9 emulator-based malware analysis tools and 128 dis-
tinct real devices. As shown in Table 3.3, the malware analysis tools covered two
versions of an offline tool called DroidBox and 7 online services. Among the online
services, 4 are derived from previous research work and 3 are security products. The
128 real devices were from AppThwack, TestObject, and Baidu MTC, all of which are
online services that automatically test applications in real phones and tablets. Note
that we did not run our artifact retriever on them due to their limited device minutes
and bandwidth quota.
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Table 3.2: Top 10 File, API, and Property Heuristics
Artifact Token Type
F1 /proc/misc “network throughput” E
F2 /proc/ioports “0ff\0:” E
F3 /proc/uid stat D
F4 /sys/devices/virtual/misc/cpu dma latency/uevent “MINOR=5” E
F5 /sys/devices/virtual/ppp D
F6 /sys/devices/virtual/switch D
F7 /sys/module/alarm/parameters D
F8
/sys/devices/system/cpu/
cpu0/cpufreq
D
F9 /sys/devices/virtual/misc/android adb D
F10 /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp syncookies E
A1 isTetheringSupported() “false” E
A2 getAuthenticatorTypes() “AuthenticatorDescription {type=com.g}” D
A3 getSystemSharedLibraryNames() “com.g” D
A4 getGlobalSearchActivity() “.android.quicksearchbox/com.android.quicksearchbox” E
A5 getWebSearchActivity() “.android.quicksearchbox/com.android.quicksearchbox” E
D
A7 getTetherableUsbRegexs() “rndis” D
A8 getEnabledInputMethodList() “.android.inputmethod.latin/.” E
A9 getDeviceId() via Binder “\0\0\03” D
A10 getTetherableIfaces() “wlan0” D
P1 qemu.hw.mainkeys E
P2 ro.build.description “release-keys” D
P3 ro.build.fingerprint “:user/release-keys” D
P4 net.eth0.dns1 E
P5 rild.libpath “/system/lib/libreference-ril.so” E
P6 ro.radio.use-ppp E
P7 gsm.version.baseband D
P8 ro.build.tags “release-key” D
P9 ro.build.display.id “test-” E
P10 init.svc.console E
3.4.2 Results and Empirical Analysis
We deem emulators as positive and real devices as negative. Given the measured
true positives (TP), false negatives (FN), false positives (FP), and true negatives
(TN), we attempt to evaluate the detection heuristics with three metrics, namely
sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy. For example, a Type E detection heuristic is
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Table 3.3: Evaluated Emulators and Real Devices
Emulators
(9)
DroidBox [10] 2.3 and 4.1, Andrubis [11], CopperDroid [105],
SandDroid [20], TraceDroid [21], Qihu 360, NVISO ApkScan, ForeSafe
Real Devices
(128)
Samsung, HTC, LGE, Huawei, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Lenovo, ZTE
Hisense, Asus, Acer, OPPO, BBK, Meizu, Gionee, DOOV, YuLong, Haier, AMOI
sensitive if it matches all the emulator instances. And, it is specific if it does not
match any non-emulator instances, i.e., real devices. Simply put, we compute the
values of the three metrics as follows:
• Sensitivity = TP/(TP + FN);
• Specificity = TN/(FP + TN); and
• Accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP + FN + FP + TN).
Table 3.4 demonstrates the measured accuracies of the 30 detection heuristics. We
next present our empirical analysis on the average accuracies from three aspects.
File, API, and Property Heuristics
97.8%File heuristics
62.9%API heuristics
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We first inspected the average accuracies of the heuristics according to the cate-
gories of their exploited observable artifacts. As shown in the above bar chart and
Table 3.4, the file heuristics enjoyed both high sensitivities and specificities with an
average accuracy of 97.8%. The API heuristics, despite of their acceptable sensi-
tivities, suffered from significantly low specificities. For example, A2, A9, and A10
performed no better than 50/50 guesses as their accuracies were less than 50%. The
property heuristics performed fairly good with an average accuracy of 89.5%.
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Table 3.4: Evaluation Results of the 30 Heuristics
TP FN FP TN Sens.(%) Spec.(%) Acc.(%)
F1 9 0 2 126 100.0 98.4 98.5
F2 9 0 0 128 100.0 100.0 100.0
F3 9 0 7 121 100.0 94.5 94.9
F4 9 0 4 124 100.0 96.9 97.1
F5 9 0 1 127 100.0 99.2 99.3
F6 9 0 1 127 100.0 99.2 99.3
F7 9 0 7 121 100.0 94.5 94.9
F8 9 0 0 128 100.0 100.0 100.0
F9 9 0 0 128 100.0 100.0 100.0
F10 9 0 8 120 100.0 93.8 94.2
TP FN FP TN Sens.(%) Spec.(%) Acc.(%)
A1 9 0 3 125 100.0 97.7 97.8
A2 7 2 82 46 77.8 35.9 38.7
A3 5 4 24 104 55.6 81.3 79.6
A4 7 2 48 80 77.8 62.5 63.5
A5 7 2 45 83 77.8 64.8 65.7
A6 9 0 37 91 100.0 71.1 73.0
A7 9 0 64 64 100.0 50.0 53.3
A8 9 0 37 91 90.0 71.1 72.5
A9 6 3 72 56 66.7 43.8 45.3
A10 9 0 82 46 100.0 35.9 40.1
TP FN FP TN Sens.(%) Spec.(%) Acc.(%)
P1 8 1 2 126 88.9 98.4 97.8
P2 8 1 17 111 88.9 86.7 86.9
P3 8 1 21 107 88.9 83.6 83.9
P4 9 0 5 123 100.0 96.1 96.4
P5 9 0 2 126 100.0 98.4 98.5
P6 9 0 11 117 100.0 91.4 92.0
P7 9 0 14 114 100.0 89.1 89.8
P8 8 1 10 118 88.9 92.2 92.0
P9 8 1 0 128 88.9 100.0 99.3
P10 9 0 20 108 100.0 84.4 85.4
One possible explanation for the API heuristics’ low accuracies is that the An-
droid APIs are designed to provide some sort of hardware/software abstraction. An
evidence is the Android Compatibility Program 2 , which precisely defines the be-
haviors of Android APIs to ensure that Android applications run in “a consistent
and standard environment.” To build such an environment, the APIs that reveal
the underlying details are not necessary, and they are subject to be removed or dep-
recated. However, we argue that this environment also requires a well-configured
application sandbox to prevent applications from bypassing the APIs. Unfortunately,
our discovered file and property heuristics imply that the current sandbox should be
reinforced.
2https://source.android.com/compatibility
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Type E and Type D Heuristics
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We investigated the differences between the Type E and Type D heuristics. As
we have discussed in Section 3.2.3, Type E and Type D detection heuristics respec-
tively indicate emulators and real devices. In our experiments, the Type E heuristics
outperformed the Type D ones.
We note that almost all of the heuristics in Table 3.4 with low specificities are
of Type D. We believe that it is due to the diversified and fragmented nature of
real devices. Type D heuristics expect the artifacts/tokens that are prevalent in real
devices. However, device manufacturers inevitably customize devices and change ar-
tifacts, which makes it harder to find the artifacts that exist in every real device. On
the contrary, emulators are much more unified in terms of customizations, which is
possibly due to the difficulty in modifying and maintaining software-emulated hard-
ware.
Artifact-based and Content-based Heuristics
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Finally, we compared the artifact-based and content-based heuristics. The bar
chart shows that the artifact-based heuristics had an average accuracy of 95.3%. The
content-based heuristics fell behind with 77.0%. However, we stress that F1, F4, and
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P9 are also content-based heuristics and their accuracies were among the top of the
30 heuristics.
In addition to the factors of abstraction and customization that we discussed
earlier, a possible explanation is that content-based heuristics are more subtle and
vulnerable to intended or unintended changes. Content-based heuristics exploit arti-
facts’ contents (e.g., configurations), which are subject to change in a rapidly evolving
system like Android. On the contrary, artifact-based heuristics rely on the presence
of certain artifacts. Compared with the contents, the artifacts (e.g., kernel modules)
are relatively consistent in emulators and real devices, because developers are usually
reluctant to remove them as to avoid unexpected problems.
3.4.3 Case Study: A9
Finally, we present a case study on heuristic A9 because it involves an Android
API getDeviceId, which has been popular among the known detection heuristics.
A9 exploits the same API but in a slightly different way. Specifically, it looks for
a token “\0\0\03” in the Binder IPC message returned from the implementation
of getDeviceId in TelephonyManagerService. In other words, A9 uses the IMEIs
whose first character is “3” to indicate real devices. However, it turned out that A9
had a sensitivity of 66.7% and an unbearable specificity of 43.8%. We investigated
the evaluated emulators and real devices to find out how they reacted to A9. The
investigation led us to flaws in an existing anti-detection technique and improvements
for A9.
A9 vs DroidBox 4.1
As we discussed in Section 3.3.1, our implementation of the artifact retriever employs
a Java function caller and a Binder IPC caller to probe Android APIs. When we
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tested A9 against DroidBox 4.1, we found that these two callers returned disparate
values, namely “357242043237511” and “000000000000000.” We note that both
callers should return the same value, because the application-side Binder proxies
of Android APIs are not supposed to modify the IPC messages returned by the
underlying Binder stubs in system services.
We inspected DroidBox’s source code and found that DroidBox rewrites the Binder
proxy of getDeviceId to return a dummy IMEI without involving the Binder stubs.
Although such a countermeasure could neutralize the detection heuristics that call
getDeviceId in a normal way, it is not effective against the Binder IPC caller, which
bypasses the countermeasure and reads the actual full-zero IMEI. Therefore, we be-
lieve that the countermeasure implemented in DroidBox 4.1 is not complete. We
note that ApkScan demonstrated the same issue, implying that ApkScan might have
integrated DroidBox 4.1 for its dynamic analysis.
However, A9 was not effective against DroidBox 2.3. We found that DroidBox 2.3
opts for a similar countermeasure but implements it in the service-side Binder stub.
In such a case, bypassing the stub and observing the actual IMEI would require root
privileges, i.e., the actual IMEI is not observable. Therefore, such a countermeasure
is effective and the dummy IMEI would appear realistic.
A9 vs Non-U.S. Devices
A9 assumes that an Android device whose IMEI starts with “3” is a real device,
otherwise it is an emulator. We checked the IMEIs of the 128 real devices and found
that this assumption is incorrect.
According to IMEI Allocation and Approval Guidelines [28], the first digit of
an IMEI is part of Reporting Body Identifier (RBI), which identifies the GSMA-
approved authority that issues the IMEI. Typically, IMEIs of mobile devices are
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issued by the authorities in the same area where the devices are sold. For example,
IMEIs of the devices sold in the U.S. are issued by the British Approvals Board
for Telecommunications (BABT) and thus start with BABT’s code “35.” Similarly,
IMEIs of the devices sold in China start with “86.” We note that about half of the
128 evaluated real devices were from Baidu MTC that uses Android phones sold in
China. Given that A9 was based on the devices in the U.S., A9 naturally got a low
specificity, and it could be improved with wild cards that match multiple RBIs.
The lesson of A9 indeed illustrates the future of the armed race between emulator
detection and anti-detection. First, Android malware could check the semantics of
the observed artifacts. For example, the dummy IMEI in DroidBox 4.1 is invalid
and could be noticed by a sophisticated adversary. Second, emulator-based malware
analysis tools should consider the observability of actual artifacts and the semantics
of dummy artifacts to be less distinguishable.
3.5 Discussion
The evaluation results imply an imminent threat that Android malware may
thwart existing emulator-based dynamic analysis systems. In this section, we sug-
gest the potential countermeasures and discuss the limitations of our work.
3.5.1 Countermeasures
Provisional countermeasures. We suggest the methods that detect the usage
of detection heuristics in Android malware as provisional countermeasures. Although
they do not prevent Android malware from detecting Android emulators, they can
raise alarms for analysts and thus thwart the malware’s original purpose of evading
analysis. For example, dynamic analysis systems could monitor accesses on files
and properties seldom used by benign applications. API heuristics are much more
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stealthy because benign applications also frequently use them. In such a case, we
suggest static data-flow analysis to locate branches that involve detection heuristics
and lead to disparate code blocks.
Short-term countermeasures. Next, we discuss the countermeasures that
allow an emulator to appear “realistic” to Android malware. First, we suggest a
comprehensive deployment of dummy artifacts. Some existing works can be adapted
to facilitate such countermeasures. For example, AirBag [118] supports a decoupled
and isolated runtime environment based on OS-level virtualization. ASM [72] provides
programmable interfaces that interpose Android APIs and return dummy values to
applications. These works, if combined and extended, can enable a “brain in a vat”
setup where an application runs in an emulator but gets dummy and valid data
originated from real devices. Second, we suggest denying accesses on unnecessary
observable artifacts with strict DAC and MAC policies. For example, artifacts in sysfs
exploited by our file heuristics seem unnecessary for general Android applications.
However, the usability impact of denying accesses still needs further verification.
Long-term countermeasures. The ideal countermeasure is to fix all the
discrepancies in Android emulators. Although Garfinkel et al. [63] concludes its in-
feasibility in 2007 due to the inherent hardness of creating indistinguishable software-
emulated hardware, hardware-assisted virtualization techniques (e.g., Intel VT-x and
VT-d) have evolved significantly to allow PC emulators to virtualize real hardware.
Currently, ARM CPUs have integrated necessary virtualization extensions. Mean-
while, commodity ARM hypervisors are also in active development. We envision
emerging Android emulators equipped with virtualized CPUs, sensors, and radios in
the near future.
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3.5.2 Limitations
Despite the robustness of Morpheus, the quality of the discovered detection heuris-
tics is limited by the small number of real devices used in finding detection heuristics
(Section 3.3). In general, Morpheus works like supervised learning, and its perfor-
mance inevitably depends on the quality of the “training set,” i.e., the emulators and
real devices observed by the artifact retriever. We note that the artifact retriever
needs approximately 20 minutes to collect the artifacts on a single device. Unfortu-
nately, online services like AppThwack (Section 3.4) do not allow the artifact retriever
to run for such a long time or upload large bulks of data. As for future work, we plan
to reach out to mobile carriers and device vendors to collect observable artifacts from
more real devices.
Although Morpheus discovered more than 10,000 heuristics, we stress that they
were derived only from 3 out of 33 sources of observable artifacts. To better un-
derstand the scope of detection heuristics for effective countermeasures, the artifact
retriever could be enhanced to address more sources of artifacts as well as sophisti-
cated usages of them. Examples include extended modules of the artifact retriever
that can handle callbacks or construct valid input parameters for Android APIs.
Our heuristic generator produces relatively rigid heuristics, such as A9 that does
not match multiple RBIs. This can be improved with more sophisticated and flexible
heuristics. For example, a token-sequence heuristic matches an ordered set of tokens
in the contents of an artifact. Moreover, a na¨ıve Bayes heuristic enables probabilis-
tic matching by aggregating the empirical probabilities of multiple artifact/token
heuristics with the Bayes’ law, assuming that the occurrences of artifacts/tokens are
independent.
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Considering that users may need to specify their preferences for selecting heuris-
tics, the flexibility of the heuristic selector could be improved. For example, users
may prefer sensitive heuristics with respect to prioritizing countermeasures. Unlike
PC malware that might have incentives for infecting VMs, Android malware must
evade emulators so they need sensitive heuristics to guarantee low false negatives.
As our future work, we plan to extend the heuristic selector to support user-defined
scoring functions.
3.6 Related Work
Behavior-based detection heuristics. Researchers have proposed several
heuristics that exploit discrepancies in runtime behaviors rather than artifacts. For
instance, a piece of specially crafted native code can identify QEMU-based emula-
tors due to the discrepancies in QEMU’s caching behaviors [88, 100, 107]. Low video
frame rate indicates emulators because of the performance drawbacks in the SDK em-
ulator’s graphics rendering engine [112]. However, these heuristics are not evaluated
against VirtualBox-based emulators and real devices. Thus, their sensitivities and
specificities require further investigation. In addition, these heuristics do not return
a decision until a sufficient number of events are observed, which tends to increase
their footprints and attract analysis. Along these lines, Morpheus addresses artifact-
based and content-based detection heuristics. More importantly, Morpheus generates
detection heuristics automatically and systematically.
Dynamic analysis frameworks. Researchers have built several dynamic anal-
ysis frameworks to vet the runtime behaviors of Android malware. TaintDroid [52]
tracks information flows that leak sensitive data to the Internet. VetDroid [123]
further reveals information flows that involve permissions. AppIntent [122] helps
determine if an information flow is user-intended. In particular, DroidScope [121]
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analyzes applications from outside emulators using virtual machine introspection.
Some of these tools have been integrated into automated malware analysis systems
such as DroidBox [10], Andrubis [11], CopperDroid [105], SandDroid [20], and Trace-
Droid [21]. They are vulnerable to be evaded using the detection heuristics in this
work as long as they are deployed in Android emulators.
3.7 Summary
Recent Android malware demonstrates the capabilities of detecting Android em-
ulators using detection heuristics. To convey the severity of this problem, we have
presented Morpheus, a system that automatically and systematically generates de-
tection heuristics. Morpheus analyzes artifacts observable by Android applications
and discovers exploitable discrepancies in Android emulators. Moreover, we have
described a proof-of-concept implementation of Morpheus, along with extensive ex-
periments and findings.
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Chapter 4
MONITORING AND CONFINEMENT: DEFENSE
Based on the lessons we learned from the work discussed in the previous chapter, we
propose comprehensive monitoring and confinement mechanisms that can be flexibly
configured to reveal and to stop Android apps’ attempts to abuse their privileges.
4.1 Problem Statement
Given the diversified attacks, it is imperative to remedy Android’s default secu-
rity mechanisms to provide better security guarantees. Recently, a wide spectrum
of security extensions has been proposed to implement enhanced MAC in Android.
Depending on how they implement MAC, we can divide them into two categories:
MAC in the Android system, and MAC in the apps.
The effectiveness of MAC implemented in operating systems has been well proved
by security frameworks such as SELinux. Such MAC implementations require patch-
ing and/or recompiling the system. In recent years, plenty of security frameworks [30,
36, 37, 44, 95, 109, 129] follow this approach to (1) add kernel MAC for reinforcing
application sandboxes; and/or (2) add middleware MAC to remedy the shortcomings
of permissions. The kernel MAC implementations reuse or extend previous Linux
MAC frameworks such as SELinux and TOMOYO Linux. The middleware MAC
implementations are usually tailored to the problems they attempt to address. In
particular, FlaskDroid [37] is the first security extension that attempts to address
diverse security requirements with a generic security framework. However, generic
MAC implementations come with a cost of relatively large code base and difficulties
in maintainability. For example, FlaskDroid includes 12 Userspace Object Managers
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(USOM). Each USOM must be re-evaluated and patched once new Android versions
are released. And it remains a question whether the 12 USOMs can completely cover
all the attack vectors. Android Security Framework (ASF) [30] attempts to address
the limitations of FlaskDroid with loadable security modules and a comprehensive set
of security APIs. Despite that the loadable modules could reduce the work required
to instantiate different security models, the security APIs themselves that are scat-
tered in various Android system services still suffer from deployment and maintenance
issues.
To address the deployment issues of system-centric MAC implementations, application-
centric approaches [45, 46, 77, 104, 119] have been proposed. These security frame-
works, which are also known as inlined reference monitors, rewrite apps by instru-
menting apps’ byte code or native code and thus do not require any changes to the
underlying Android system. Despite their significant improvement in deployment, a
recent study [69] shows that application-centric MAC implementations are subtle and
they could be bypassed or subverted, because the instrumented code runs within the
same process as that of the confined app. Apparently, an app is able to modify itself
to remove or suppress the instrumented code.
In this chapter, we will re-explore the problem of designing and implementing a
practical MAC framework for Android. We propose a multi-layer security framework
called TripleMon. Unlike previous work, TripleMon opts for a system-centric and
IPC-oriented approach. Specifically, TripleMon extends the IPC subsystem of An-
droid to mediate various types of IPC channels that can be used by Android apps to
access resources outside their sandboxes. While supporting complete mediation and
tamperproofness, TripleMon also enables users to flexibly control the capabilities of
apps in a fine-grained manner.
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4.2 A Multi-layered Approach to Protect Android
Mandatory access control is a type of access control by which the operating system
confines the abilities of subjects to access certain objects based on a centralized secu-
rity policy. An effective MAC implementation, no matter whether it is system-centric
or application-centric, should fulfill at least the following design goals:
G1 Complete mediation. We should implement mechanisms that completely
mediate access vectors that could be used by a subject in the system, so that the
subject cannot bypass our mechanisms.
G2 Tamper proof. We should prevent attackers from undermining our secu-
rity mechanisms. This includes protecting the integrity of the security mechanisms
themselves as well as protecting security policies.
Towards a practical MAC implementation, we further propose the additional de-
sign goals:
G3 Generic and flexible. We should be able to dynamically re-configure the
security mechanisms using flexible security policies.
G4 Unified policy scheme. Composing and managing security policies could be
tedious and error-prone for system administrators. To reduce the workload of policy
management, we expect the security policy to use a unified scheme for different types
of subjects, objects, and operations.
G5 Easy maintenance. The maintenance of the code should be simple across
different OS versions. In particular, it should require little work to re-evaluate the
effectiveness of the MAC implementation against newer OS versions.
To achieve these goals, we propose TripleMon, which is a multi-layer and policy-
agnostic MAC implementation. Figure 4.1 depicts the proposed architecture of Triple-
Mon, which consists of a set of reference monitors and a decision manager. TripleMon
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Figure 4.1: Proposed Multi-layer Security Framework for Android
opts to a multi-layer design because Android itself is composed of three layers: apps,
middleware, and Linux. Each layer has its respective access control semantics and
thus requires a dedicated reference monitor.
TripleMon’s reference monitors use a different design compared with FlaskDroid.
FlaskDroid achieves G3 by placing enforcement hooks in various Android system
services, such as ActivityManager, SensorManager, and TelephonyManager. However,
it is hard to justify the completeness (G1) of such an approach, because it is infeasible
and futile to hook every function in more than 50 system services in Android. And
maintaining various hooks here and there is also difficult in a fast evolving operating
system like Android (G5). To address this issue, we are inspired by SELinux which
uses few hooks that are actually “choke points” of sensitive operations. In particular,
we identify the boundaries of IPC channels as our choke points because Android apps
must use IPC to access sensitive resources outside their sandboxes. Furthermore,
Android IPC mechanisms are part of the core libraries and they have not been changed
remarkably compared to the system services that FlaskDroid depends on. Therefore,
mediating ICC, Binder IPC, and Linux IPC channels allows TripleMon to minimize
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the cost of G5 while satisfying G1 and G3. Moreover, the reference monitors at
lower layers (OSMon) can protect the integrity of reference monitors at higher layers
(BinderMon and ICCMon).
TripleMon also includes a decision manager to address the semantic gaps among
reference monitors. Semantic gaps arise when a resource corresponds to multiple
objects at different layers. For example, an app can take a picture using (1) the
camera app; (2) the system service that controls the camera; or (3) the device node
of the camera (/dev/video0). Suppose we are to revoke an app’s capabilities of taking
pictures, the decision manager can issue decisions for all the reference monitors to
block accesses at all layers. In addition, the decision manager also follows a unified
policy scheme and resolves inconsistencies once conflicting access control decisions
are generated for the same object. The unified policy scheme also makes it easier to
analyze security policies at different layers to evaluate the system-wide assurance.
4.2.1 Reference Monitor for ICC
We propose ICCMon to handle ICC requests. We choose ActivityManagerService
as the choke point for ICCMon because ActivityManagerService is the single system
service responsible for establishing and shutting down ICC channels.
Figure 4.2 depicts the workflow of ICCMon. Specifically, ICCMon labels compo-
nents with the UIDs of their corresponding app processes, and labels intents with
their meta-information including action, category, and data URI. To ensure com-
plete mediation, we analyze the call graph of ActivityManagerService and identify
4 functions that can capture all ICC requests, including startActivityLocked(),
startServiceLocked(), getContentProvider() and deliverToRegistered
BroadcastReceiversLocked(). From the names of these functions we can notice
that they handle ICC channels to activities, services, broadcast receivers, and con-
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tent providers, respectively. These hooks placed just before ActivityManagerService
is about to establish an ICC channel, which is similar to how hooks are placed in Linux
Security Modules. Using these hooks, ICCMon enforces security decisions acquired
from the decision manager. ICCMon returns control to ActivityManagerService if an
ICC request is accepted. Otherwise, ICCMon generates a security exception for the
caller app to shut down the ICC channel.
4.2.2 Reference Monitor for Binder IPC
Android APIs are implemented based on Binder IPC. The mappings between An-
droid APIs and Binder IPC transactions are specified in the AIDL 1 files provided
with the source code of Android. For example, Binder IPC requests on whose des-
tination is a system service called iphonesubinfo and whose command code is 1
correspond to an API getDeviceID. Therefore, we can infer the semantics of any
Binder IPC request by checking corresponding Android API that it can be mapped
to.
1Android Interface Definition Language
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To identify choke points of Binder IPC, we analyze the entire Binder IPC subsys-
tem and we choose to place the enforcement hooks in LibBinder (/system/lib/libbinder.so),
because it is the dynamic library linked to all the system services. As long as Lib-
Binder and the system services are not compromised, BinderMon can intercept all
the Binder IPC requests sent to the system services.
BinderMon mediates Binder IPC before the permission framework is consulted.
Therefore, it enables dynamic permission revocation without affecting the existing
permission framework. Furthermore, BinderMon offers finer granularities at the API
level, whereas the granularity of the Android permission framework is a set of permis-
sions where each permission maps to multiple APIs. Moreover, BinderMon protects
1,448 public and private Android APIs implemented by more than 70 system services,
while FlaskDroid only protects 136 APIs in 12 system services.
A detailed workflow of BinderMon is shown in Figure 4.3. To make an API call,
an app sends an Binder IPC request using the proxy of the API’s corresponding
remote system service (Step 1). Alternatively, this app can send a request without
involving the proxy (Step 1’). BinderMon intercepts both types of requests and
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queries the decision manager with the caller app’s UID, the callee service’s name, and
the command code which indicates the API to be called. If the request is allowed,
BinderMon returns control to LibBinder. Otherwise, BinderMon shuts down the IPC
channel and returns an error code PERMISSION DENIED to the caller app.
4.2.3 Reference Monitor for Linux IPC
The default Android app sandbox is flawed. Although Android apps are expected
to use Android APIs to access system resources, they still possess capabilities to
bypass APIs and access sensitive Linux IPC channels that general Android apps
should not necessarily use. However, ICCMon and BinderMon cannot revoke all of
these unnecessary capabilities. Therefore, we propose a kernelspace reference monitor,
OSMon, to mediate Linux IPC channels and enforce the principle of least privilege
for Android apps.
Figure 4.4 depicts the workflow of OSMon. Similar to SELinux [110] and TO-
MOYO Linux [70], we identify choke points as the hooks defined by Linux Security
Module (LSM) [117]. However, OSMon only use the hooks are are specific to the
Linux IPC mechanisms. Table 4.1 shows the proposed 23 hooks which cover ob-
jects like inodes, file systems, tasks, local sockets, Unix-domain sockets, and Netlink
sockets. These hooks can be enabled or disabled individually in the kernel configu-
ration file. In addition, OSMon plays as the trusted computing base (TCB) of the
entire TripleMon framework. It protects all the userspace components of Triple-
Mon, including ICCMon, BinderMon, the decision manager, and the policy database.
Moreover, OSMon protects itself against root exploits by depriving untrusted apps’
capabilities to access IPC channels that may subvert OSMon.
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Table 4.1: Implemented Hooks in OSMon
Hook category Hook name
Local socket socket create, socket connect, socket bind, socket send
Unix-domain socket ud connect, ud send
Netlink socket netlink send, netlink recv
Task task create, task setuid, task setgid, task kill
File
inode create, inode rename, inode mkdir, inode rmdir,
inode link, inode symlink, inode unlink, inode setattr,
dentry open
File System sb mount, sb unmount
4.2.4 Multi-layer Policy Modules
Our unified policy scheme for TripleMon is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Target). A target is a 3-tuple < Subject, Resource, Action >, where
• Subject is a set of entities to which the authorization is granted;
• Resource is a set of entities to which accesses need to be mediated; and
• Action is a set of actions being authorized or forbidden.
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Definition 2 (Access Control Policy). An access control policy is a 3-tuple
{Target, Condition, Effect}, where
• Target decides whether an access request is applicable to the policy. The target
specification is defined in Definition 1;
• Condition specifies restrictions on the attributes in the target and refines the
applicability of the policy; and
• Effect ∈ {accept, deny} is the authorization effect of the policy.
To evaluate an access request over access control policies, if the request satisfies
both the target and condition of a policy, the response is sent with the decision
specified by the effect element in the policy. Otherwise, the response yields “deny”.
We next describe three kinds of TripleMon policy: ICC policy, Binder policy
and OS policy in detail. Table 4.2 summarizes the major components contained in
three kinds of TripleMon policies.
ICC Policy
ICC policies regulate the intent-based IPC between applications. Thus, application
group, application, and component comprise the subject and resource of an ICC
policy. Actions correspond to the APIs that initiate ICC to four types of components,
namely activities, services, broadcast receivers and content providers. Condition is
defined as the attributes used in intents. Table 4.2 illustrates the elements of ICC
policy.
For example, an adversary who does not possess the INTERNET permission may
still access the Internet by sending an intent with action ACTION VIEW and the url
to the Browser application. We can mitigate such a privilege escalation attack by
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Table 4.2: Components in TripleMon Policies
ICC Policy Binder Policy OS Policy
Target
Subject
Application Group Application Group Application Group
Application Application Application
Component System
File
Resource
Application Group Service Linux IPC channel
Application Process
Component File
Filesystem
Action
startActivity Call Linux IPC
bindService Task
sendBoradcast Inode
accessContentProvider Filesystem
Condition
Action Service cmd code System call’s name
Category Parameters
Data
Effect
Accept Accept Accept
Deny Deny Deny
specifying and enforcing an ICC policy to prevent the adversary from sending such
an intent to the Browser application.
Binder Policy
Binder policies specify the behaviors of Binder IPC channels between applications
and system services. Thus, application group and application comprise the subject,
and system service comprises the resource. Action has only one instance, call. And
condition specifies the command code of the command to be executed by the remote
services, as shown in Table 4.2.
For instance, as we discussed previously, the permission READ PHONE STATE allows
an application to access resources such as the unique device IDs and the phone’s
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state. We can set a Binder policy to revoke an application’s privilege of accessing
the device IDs but keep an access privilege to the phone’s state without reinstalling
the application. Compared with the default permission framework which treats the
capabilities for a permission as an indivisible block, our approach obviously enables
a more fine-grained and revocable access control.
OS Policy
OS policies mediate Linux IPC channels. In an OS policy, as illustrated in Table 4.2,
subject consists of application group, application, system and file. Resource consists
of file, filesystem, process and Linux IPC channel. Action has four types: inode,
filesystem, task, and Linux IPC. These actions correspond to different categories of
operations on Linux IPC channels. Condition specifies the name of the exact oper-
ation and optional parameters.
As we mentioned earlier, GingerBreak is a root exploit that attacks a system
service called Vold by sending forged and malformed Netlink messages. Such an ex-
ploit can be easily prevented by defining an OS policy that disables applications from
sending Netlink messages. Indeed, Android applications are currently not strictly pro-
hibited from using some operating system features. Malicious applications may take
advantage of these features to launch attacks. Thus, we need to define corresponding
OS policies to prevent applications from abusing these features.
4.2.5 Decision Manager
The decision manager is the policy decision point of TripleMon where IPC
requests are evaluated against authorization policies. It centrally issues access control
decisions for each reference monitor, manages security policies, and resolves conflicts
among reference monitors.
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Communication with Reference Monitors
As the only policy decision point in TripleMon, the decision manager runs in a
dedicated process and communicates with the reference monitors via a local socket
interface. The communication follows the policy scheme we defined in Section 4.2.4.
Indeed, this interface needs special attention because it can subvert TripleMon or
cause denial of service if exploited. To protect this interface, OSMon enforces a set of
top-priority policy rules to only allow the decision manager to write into the interface.
Policy Management
The decision manager parses a JSON-like plaintext policy file that follows the pol-
icy scheme defined in Section 4.2.4. The policy file is stored in an internal read-
only filesystem. In addition, OSMon enforces rules to disallow access on the policy
database from any process except the decision manager.
The decision manager maintains two tracks of security policies, namely slow track
and fast track. The slow track is enforced by OSMon only. This track defines the com-
mon and least privileges of general installed applications. The fast track is enforced by
ICCMon and BinderMon. This track expects more frequent policy updates because
ICCMon and BinderMon are required to meet per-application security requirements.
Specifically, ICCMon or BinderMon always consults the decision manager to acquire
decisions generated based on the latest fast track policy. On the contrary, OSMon
caches a copy of the slow track policy in the kernel and makes decisions by itself.
It only consults the decision manager to get the latest slow track policy when it
initializes itself.
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Decision Reconciliation
Decision reconciliation is necessary to resolve conflicts when multiple reference moni-
tors are involved to mediate accesses on the same resource. For example, an adversary
attempts to access the camera via ICC and Binder IPC, expecting that there would be
a capability leak somewhere. Suppose a strategy, deny-overrides, is applied. The
decision manager ensures that ICCMon and BinderMon both deny the requests to ac-
cess the camera if there is any applicable ICC or Binder policy that evaluates to deny.
More flexible strategies[85], such as first-applicable and strong-consensus, can
be adopted to resolve the decision inconsistencies.
4.3 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate TripleMon in terms of its coverage, effectiveness and
performance overheads. Our experiments were performed on a Galaxy Nexus running
Android 4.2.2 and Linux kernel 3.0.31.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
Similar to other policy-driven MAC implementations, TripleMon requires a
good security policy to be effective. In TripleMon, we opt to semi-automatically
and iteratively derive policy rules from applications’ runtime behaviors. We first
configured TripleMon into a permissive mode where it only logs IPC requests. We
then executed a set of benign applications and a set of malicious applications. By
comparing the observed IPC requests, we identified the IPC requests to be allowed
or denied in our security policy.
For the set of benign applications, we handpicked 10 applications (Table 4.3) from
Google Play’s top charts. These applications are from renowned developers and under
different application categories. We assumed that these applications are trusted by
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Table 4.3: Applications Assumed to be Benign and Trusted by General Users
Application Category
AmazonMobile Shopping
BejeweledBlitz Game
ChaseMobile Finance
Dictionary.com Books & Reference
Dropbox Productivity
Google+ Social
GooglePlayMovies&TV Media & Video
Hangouts(replacesTalk) Communication
MoviesbyFlixster Entertainment
Yelp Travel & Local
general users and we used them to outline the general expected runtime behaviors
of Android applications. The malicious applications were 1,260 malware samples
from the Android Malware Genome Project. We fuzzed each application through 5
iterations with randomized touch inputs and system events.
4.3.2 Coverage
The generated policy demonstrated the coverage of system resources protected
by TripleMon. Compared to one of closely related work FlaskDroid [37], Triple-
Mon provides the same level of protection on ICC channels and much more protec-
tion on Binder IPC channels. Table 4.4 shows the system services that appeared in
TripleMon’s security policy but cannot be protected by FlaskDroid. For example,
AccountManager needs enhanced protection because it is a centralized registry of a
user’s online accounts.
In terms of Linux IPC channels, TripleMon provides relatively less coverage
compared to FlaskDroid whose kernel MAC is built upon SELinux. Indeed, Triple-
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Table 4.4: System Services Protected by TripleMon
Service Example APIs
AccountManager getAccounts, getPassword, peekAuthToken, invalidateAuthToken
AlarmManager setTimeZone
BackupManager setBackupEnabled, setAutoRestore
Bluetooth createBond, isDiscovering, getUuids, getScanMode
ConnectivityManager getActiveNetworkInfo, getProxy, tether, startUsingNetworkFeature
EmailService searchMessages, loadAttachment, sendMeetingResponse
NFCManager setForegroundDispatch, setNdefPushCallback
SipService open, close, createSession, setRegistrationListener
VibrationService vibrate, vibratePattern
WifiManager setFrequencyBand, getWifiApConfiguratin, getScanResults
Mon only implements a subset of hooks used by SELinux. However we note that
OSMon follows a policy schema that is consistent with BinderMon and ICCMon. And
a consistent policy schema is necessary for efficient policy management. Compared to
FlaskDroid that is more likely putting two incompatible reference monitors together,
TripleMon’s three reference monitors augment each other and behave as a single
reference monitor.
4.3.3 Case Studies
To further validate the effectiveness of TripleMon, we tested TripleMon
against real malware samples and synthetic applications that implement the attacks
that we discussed in Chapter 2.
ICCMon vs Information Stealing Malware
To test ICCMon, we selected a malware strain called Gone60 (short for “gone in sixty
seconds”). Gone6- accesses the Contact applications via ICC channels and uploads
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user’s contacts to remote servers. In our experiments, we put the malware samples
into an application group designated for testing suspicious applications. Then, we
applied the following ICC policies to revoke this application group’s capabilities to
access user’s contacts. The experiments on 9 Gone60 samples demonstrated that
TripleMon successfully denied the accesses on the contacts.
1 " ICCPolicy_Gone60 ": {
2 "type" : "ICC"
3 " target ": {
4 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
5 " resource " : [" com. android . contacts "],
6 " action " : [" ContentProvider ", " Activity "]
7 },
8 " condition " : ["*"] ,
9 " effect " : "deny" }
BinderMon vs Coarse-grained Permissions
Next, we validated BinderMon by partially revoking the capabilities covered by
a permission called READ PHONE STATE for privacy purposes. READ PHONE STATE is a
commonly abused permission because it allows applications to call an API getDeviceID
and read the unique device identifier which could facilitate user tracking. However,
simply revoking this permission could break applications because this permission also
covers APIs other than getDeviceID. To protect user’s privacy, we employed the fol-
lowing Binder policies to revoke an application’s capability to call getDeviceID with-
out affecting the other APIs. In our experiments on 20 randomly selected malware
samples that use getDeviceId, BinderMon denied every request to getDeviceID.
We further verified the results by inspecting the files and network traces. And we
discovered that no information related to device ID was leaked.
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1 " BinderPolicy_CapabilityRevoking ": {
2 "type" : " BINDER "
3 " target ": {
4 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
5 " resource " : [" iphonesubinfo "],
6 " action " : [" Call "]
7 },
8 " condition " : [" cmd =1"] ,
9 " effect " : "deny" }
OSMon vs Root Exploits
In Table 4.5, we show a list of known root exploits [126], vulnerabilities, and pro-
grams attacked by the exploits. We also show the hooks of TripleMon used
to prevent corresponding exploits from gaining root privileges. Denying setuid is
a straightforward countermeasure and can prevent all of exploits from escalating
their privileges. We also employed alternative hooks to protect the target of ex-
ploits. For example, Exploid sends malformed Netlink messages to the kernel via
/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug. We can mitigate this exploit by revoking its capabili-
ties to use Netlink, and/or use /proc/sys/kernel. In addition, most exploits attempt
to remount system as read-write to retain their root privileges even after the reboot.
Thus, the filesystem hooks of TripleMon are helpful to neutralize such attempts.
In our experiments, we tested two exploits, GingerBreak and ZergRush, which
have been used by recent malicious applications [8, 9]. GingerBreak and ZergRush
attack Vold’s Netlink socket and local socket, respectively. Therefore, we defined the
following policies to prevent unauthorized apps from accessing these sensitive sockets
exposed by Vold.
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Table 4.5: Root Exploits and Countermeasures with TripleMon
Root Exploit Vulnerable Program OSMon Hooks
Asroot [2] kernel localsocket, setuid
Exploid [1] init netlink, setuid, inode
Zimperlich [4] zygote task create, setuid
RAtC [3] adbd task create, setuid
KillingInTheNameOf [6] ashmem setuid
Psneuter [6] ashmem setuid
GingerBreak [8] vold netlink, setuid
ZergRush [9] libsysutils localsocket, setuid
Mempodipper [12] kernel inode, setuid
1 " OSPolicy_Gingerbreak ": {
2 "type" : "OS"
3 " target ": {
4 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
5 " resource " : [" vold "],
6 " action " : [" netlink "]},
7 " condition " : [" cmd= netlink_send "],
8 " effect " : "deny" }
1 " OSPolicy_ZergRush ": {
2 "type" : "OS"
3 " target ": {
4 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
5 " resource " : [" vold "],
6 " action " : [" localsocket "]},
7 " condition " : [" cmd= socket_connect "],
8 " effect " : "deny" }
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Figure 4.5: ZergRush Fails to Exploit Vold
We tested the exploits using (1) samples of GingerMaster, and (2) the shell of
Android Debugging Bridge (ADB). Our experimental results showed that OSMon
can successfully intercept and prevent such exploits. Figure 4.5 depicts that ZergRush
failed because OSMon denied its attempt to crash vold.
We further examined a list of known root exploits 2 . We analyzed their ex-
ploited vulnerabilities and source code to verify the feasibility of mitigating them
with TripleMon. In general, we found that most exploits take advantage of certain
system resources that general applications would not write into, such as /data/data/
recovery/log and /dev/graphics/fb0. Indeed, Android applications are expected
to access system resources (e.g., device nodes) indirectly via Android APIs. There-
fore, OSMon is able to revoke the unnecessary capabilities and prevent such exploits.
Note that OSMon does not prevent exploits that use the necessary capabilities of
applications. For example, libperf event exploits the kernel using a crafted system
call [15].
2https://github.com/droidsec/droidsec.github.io/wiki/Vuln-Exploit-List
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Decision Reconciliation
Next we evaluated how the decision managers helped coordinate the reference mon-
itors. An Android application may read/write the SMS storage with a two-step
method: acquiring a handle to the SMS database via ICC, and then accessing the
database file.
We defined a policy set to mediate applications’ accesses on SMS. The policy
rules in the same policy set protect the same resource (SMS) that corresponds to the
objects at multiple layers. As each access involves multiple steps, we define a policy for
each step. The decisions made by two policies were aggregated, and the final decision
was then made by leveraging the deny-overrides strategy. Our experimental results
showed that the access was finally denied because the second policy evaluated to deny
which overrode the first policy.
1 PolicySet_SMS_ReadWrite : {
2 " SMS_ReadWrite_1 ": {
3 "type" : "ICC",
4 " target ": {
5 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
6 " resource " : [" com. android . providers . telephony "],
7 " action " : [" ContentProvider "]},
8 " condition " : [" URI=sms /*"] ,
9 " effect " : " accept "},
10 " SMS_ReadWrite_2 ": {
11 "type" : "OS",
12 " target ": {
13 " subject " : [" GROUP_suspicious "],
14 " resource " : ["/ data/data/com. android . providers .
telephony / mmssms .db"],
15 " action " : [" file "]},
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Table 4.6: Performance Overhead Compared to Related Work
µ in ms σ in ms
ICCMon 0.132 1.060
BinderMon 2.392 4.653
FlaskDroid [37] 0.452 4.887
XManDroid [35] 0.532 2.150
TrustDroid [36] 0.170 1.910
16 " condition " : [" cmd= dentry_open "],
17 " effect " : "deny "}
18 }
4.3.4 Performance
Our implementation of TripleMon imposes imperceptible runtime overhead.
Table 4.6 presents the mean execution time µ and the standard decision σ for per-
forming a policy check. ICCMon has its counterparts in the three closely related
MAC implementations and it incurs less runtime overhead. BinderMon is a unique
component in our design and its performance is incomparable to the related imple-
mentations. We did not evaluate OSMon because it is implemented as a standard
Linux security module, and the runtime overhead of such modules has been well stud-
ied in the related kernel MAC implementations such as SEAndroid and TOMOYO
Linux. In addition, the average footprint of TripleMon is negligible compared to
the sizes of existing components, as shown in Table 4.7.
4.4 Discussion
The policy generation process using benign and malicious applications is limited
by the fact that dynamic random fuzzy testing fundamentally fails to reveal all pos-
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Table 4.7: Memory Overhead
File Original (KB) TripleMon (KB) Overhead (KB)
Services.jar 1155.00 1157.82 2.82
LibBinder 1766.54 1782.02 15.48
Kernel (boot.img) 4571.14 4587.52 16.38
Decision manager N/A 13.71 13.71
sible execution paths. Recent work [64] shows that the coverage can be lower than
40%. Thus, the policy still has a lot of space to improve. For the malware samples
used in our evaluation, we observed that their malicious payloads usually executed
immediately after the applications started. Therefore, fuzzy testing over a large num-
ber of malware samples is helpful for understanding common malicious behaviors to
be denied in our policy.
In TripleMon, we manually and statically analyze the Andorid IPC subsystem
to identify choke points, i.e., places for inserting authorization hooks. We believe
that an automated approach should be explored to comprehensively and system-
atically identify potential missing choke points. For example, we could introduce
dynamic information flow tracking to identify various points that “forward” informa-
tion flows between different domains. A similar approach has been proposed in [89] to
specifically address client-server software. Such approaches could facility the design
of reference monitors that can provide better assurance towards complete mediation.
The current implementation of TripleMon is a proof-of-concept prototype so
usability analysis and improvement would be another area to be explored. Despite
that TripleMon opts for a simple format of policy scheme with relatively rich ex-
pressiveness to ease the burden of policy management, it would be helpful to have
user-friendly utilities for creating, maintaining and synchronizing policies. We have
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implemented a simple web-based management interface for TripleMon. We will
continue improving its usability in our future work.
4.5 Related Work
Android security mechanisms have attracted significant attention in recent years.
A large number of research projects have been conducted for designing and imple-
menting security extensions on Android to tackle a variety of specific attacks.
FlaskDroid [37] is a two-layer MAC framework that provides flexible and fine-
grained mandatory access control on both Android’s middleware and kernel layers. It
bears the most similarity with our framework. While FlaskDroid and TripleMon
both opt for a multi-layer architecture to address the respective semantics of each
layer, TripleMon utilizes the peculiarities of Android IPC to be generic and effi-
cient. Specifically, TripleMon’s middleware MAC interposes the Binder IPC and
ICC channels between applications and system services. This design choice allows
TripleMon to enforce system-wide access control polices without modifying sys-
tem services. FlaskDroid’s exemplary implementation provides 12 User Space Object
Managers to monitor 40 APIs while TripleMon covers 1,448 public and hidden
APIs.
Smalley et al. [109] proposed SEAndroid that extends SELinux as kernel-level
MAC and adopts a set of middleware extensions to support middleware MAC. Unlike
TripleMon, SEAndroid middleware MAC is only responsible for passing middle-
ware contexts to kernel MAC. The underlying kernel MAC, despite that it has lim-
ited semantics of other layers, makes decisions for events occurred at the middleware
layer. This situation limits SEAndroid middleware MAC in mitigating corresponding
attacks in a fine-grained and accurate manner. In contrast, TripleMon provides ref-
64
erence monitoring at different layers to tackle their respective semantics and employs
decision reconciliation to address the possible inconsistencies among them.
XManDroid [35] and TrustDroid [36] both are multi-layer security frameworks
that adopt TOMOYO Linux as the underlying kernel MAC and a set of middleware
extensions for middlware MAC. Their middlware MAC implementations are tailored
to their specific problems: XManDroid [35] attempts to mitigate privilege escalation
attacks and TrustDroid [36] establishs an isolated domain for business applications.
Along these lines, TripleMon is a generic security framework and can adjust to
different threat models and security requirements with user-specified access control
policies.
QUIRE [48] enables provenance in Android IPC by propagating verifiable signa-
tures along IPC chains. The signature provides context of the sender application
so that a recipient can authenticate the origin of the data they received indirectly.
However QUIRE requires that applications must be modified to support QUIRE-style
IPC, which is infeasible for most applications whose source code is not available to
general users. In contract to QUIRE, TripleMon works with unmodified applica-
tions to maintain the compatibility of existing applications.
IPC Inspection [60] is a security framework for tackling permission re-delegation
attacks. IPC Inspection reduces the privileges of a recipient application to the inter-
section of permissions of applications along the IPC chain. However, automatically
restricting permissions for collaborative applications is not a decent solution in some
cases and may lead to usability loss. Our work employs a policy-based approach and
users can specify a group of her trusted applications which can collaborate with each
other without restrictions.
TISSA [129] is a policy-driven security extension that protects user’s private data.
TISSA implements a privacy mode where access to private data can be dynamically
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and independently controlled. TISSA puts hooks in several privacy-related system
services, such as LocationManagerService and TelephonyManagerService. The hooks
redirect control flows to a centralized decision maker. Compared to TISSA, Triple-
Mon provides broader coverage of user’s data by mediating most IPC channels used
by Android applications.
Several recent work addressed fine-grained and context-aware ICC mediation.
SAINT [94] is a policy-driven framework that enforces semantically rich policies on
ICC at runtime and during installation. Apex [91] provides a similar solution where
users can specify runtime constraints for applications. CRePe [44] enables context-
aware ICC where environmental constraints such as location and time can be consid-
ered for policy enforcement. Although these extensions are not sufficient to cover all
existing attacks discussed in Chapter 2 they demonstrate the necessity and value of
flexible and fine-grained access control in ICC. Inspired by their work, TripleMon
includes a dedicated sub-monitor that addresses the attacks at this layer.
TripleMon requires modifying the Android platform. Although an automated
installation kit can reduce the deployment overhead, it cannot entirely eliminate it.
Recent research [46, 77, 108, 119] proposed inlined reference monitors by placing hooks
inside applications instead of TripleMon’s system-centric approach. For example,
Aurasium [119] inserts native bootstrapping code into compiled Android applications
so as to interpose Libc and mediate Linux system calls. However, such reference
monitors are prone to be subverted because they run with the same privileges as
the code they are attempting to confine. And Hao et al. [69] demonstrates several
potential attacks which may render such reference monitors ineffective or infeasible.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design and implementation of a multi-layer
security framework, TripleMon, that provides flexible and fine-grained access con-
trol on Android. TripleMon could mediate multiple Android IPC channels (namely,
ICC, Binder IPC and Linux IPC) to prevent prominent attacks that could bypass
the existing Android security mechanisms. TripleMon monitors and determines
the suspicious behaviors of applications that would lead to appropriate policies for
mitigating the attacks. Our experiments showed the common behaviors of Android
malware in the wild, and demonstrated the effectiveness and practicality of our ap-
proach. The performance measurements also showed that our system has produced
only a manageable performance overhead.
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Chapter 5
RISK-DRIVEN ASSESSMENT
Helping users understand security and privacy risks of apps is still an ongoing
challenge for modern mobile platforms. In this chapter, we propose an risk-driven
assessment approach to cope with such a challenge and present a continuous and auto-
mated risk assessment framework called RiskMon that uses machine-learned ranking
to assess risks incurred by users’ installed apps. The preliminary results are published
[78, 79].
5.1 Problem Statement
Primarily, Android relies on permissions to help users understand the security
and privacy risks of apps. An app must request permissions to be allowed to access
sensitive resources. In other words, it is mandatory for Android apps to present
its expected behaviors to users. Even though permissions outline the resources that
an app attempts to access, they do not provide fine-grained information about how
such resources will be used. Suppose a user installs an app and allows it to access
her location information. It is hard for her to determine whether the app accesses
her locations on her demand or periodically without asking for her explicit consent.
Therefore, it is imperative to continuously monitor the installed apps so that a user
could be informed when rogue apps abuse her sensitive information. Previous work
has proposed real-time monitoring to reveal potential misbehaviors of third-party
apps [52, 76, 103, 121]. While these techniques partially provide valuable insights
into a user’s installed apps, it is still critical to answer the following challenge: are
the behaviors in mobile apps necessarily inappropriate?
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To answer this question, it is an end-user’s responsibility to conduct risk assess-
ment and make decisions based on her disposition and perception. Risk assessment is
not a trivial task because it requires the user to digest diverse contextual and techni-
cal information. In addition, the user needs to apprehend expected behaviors of apps
under different contexts prior to addressing her risk assessment baseline. However, it
is impractical for the normal users to distill such a baseline. Instead, it is essential
to develop an automated approach to continuously monitor apps and effectively alert
users upon security and privacy violations.
Previous research concerning apps’ behaviors specifies a set of risk assessment
heuristics tailored to their specific problems. For example, TaintDroid [52] considers
a case in which sensitive data is transmitted over the network. DroidRanger [128] and
RiskRanker [67] assume that dynamically loaded code is a potential sign of malware.
While these techniques provide valuable insights about runtime behaviors of mobile
apps, they do not justify the appropriateness of the revealed behaviors. We argue
that meta information can provide the necessary operational contexts that justify
runtime behaviors for risk assessment. For example, a location-based app has good
reasons to upload a user’s locations for discovering nearby restaurants. In contrast, it
does not make sense for a video player to use the locations and such behaviors should
be considered as more risky.
Finally, we need to consider how users participate in risk assessment. Different
users would have disparate security requirements. Thus, we should allow users to
specify their preferences in terms of accessing their own sensitive information. More-
over, normal users do not possess the necessary technical knowledge for assessing apps’
runtime behaviors and interpret numerical risk scores. Therefore, it is imperative to
automate risk assessment in a way that requires less sophistication and intervention.
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5.2 Risk Assessment of Android Applications
In this section, we describe our proposed risk assessment framework, called Risk-
Mon, that lowers the required intervention and sophistication in risk assessment of
mobile apps. IT risk assessment guidelines, such as NIST SP 800-30 [111] and CERT
OCTAVE [26], provide a foundation for the development of effective risk management
processes. They illustrate comprehensive methodologies that enable organizations to
understand, assess and address their information risks. While these guidelines deal
with the infrastructure and organizational risks by security experts, our framework
attempts to adapt and automate the sophisticated risk assessment tasks for general
users.
An underlying assumption of RiskMon is that a user’s trusted applications could
define her expected appropriate behaviors. Recent empirical analysis showed that
applications of similar categories normally request a similar set of permissions [34],
implying similar core functionalities. Hence, each of the user’s trusted applications
can be used as a reference point of appropriate behaviors for applications of simi-
lar categories. For example, Netflix application is under “Entertainment” category,
and Pandora’s Internet Radio application is under “Music & Audio” category. Even
though they are not in the same category, each application similarly uses one of core
functionalities such as the streaming service of personalized media contents from re-
mote servers. If a user trusts Netflix application, it implicitly affirms that Pandora
application may also incur commensurate risks caused by Netflix application. Thus,
using Netflix application as a reference point, the deviation or “distance” of runtime
behaviors between Netflix and Pandora applications indicates Pandora’s additional
inherent risks.
We now summarize the design goals as follows:
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Continuous and fine-grained behavior monitoring: Applications access sensitive
resources by calling APIs to communicate with each other and system services. To
ensure continuous monitoring on API calls, RiskMon interposes Binder IPC on a
user’s device. The risks incurred by API calls are determined by the caller, the callee,
and the data. To capture such information, RiskMon opts for a fine-grained scheme
to capture various intelligence about applications. This provides a well-founded base
for measuring the “distance” between two API calls in the space of runtime behaviors.
Simplified security requirement communication: It is a challenging task for users
to specify security requirements for security tools. To tackle this problem, RiskMon
adopts a simple heuristic that allows users to communicate security requirements
through their coarse expectations. Although this reduces the burden on the user, we
cannot entirely eliminate it. We note that acquiring a user’s expectations is necessary
since each user has diverse preferences on the same application. For instance, all users
of Facebook application may have disparate expectations for controlling their location
and camera utilities.
Intuitive risk representation: The way in which risk is presented significantly
influences a user’s perception and decision upon risky applications. A counterexample
would be standalone risk scores, such as a risk indicator saying “Facebook incurs
90 units of risk” without proper explanation. As Peng et al. noted in [99], “it is
more effective to present comparative risk information”. Inspired by their approach,
RiskMon presents a ranking of applications so that a user can compare the potential
loss of using an application with other applications. In addition, the user can view
the risk composition of an application for supporting evidences.
Iterative risk management: Risk assessment is an ongoing iterative process. As
applications get upgraded and bring more functionalities, they introduce new risks
that should be measured. To this end, the risk assessment baseline should evolve to
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continuously monitor installed applications and update the risk assessment baseline
periodically. Moreover, users need to provide their feedbacks to RiskMon by adding
or revising their security requirements.
Figure 5.1 depicts the proposed architecture of RiskMon. RiskMon consists of
three components: an app intelligence aggregator, a baseline learner, and a risk meter.
The application intelligence aggregator compiles a dataset from API traces collected
on a user’s device and meta information crawled from application markets. API traces
cover an application’s interactions with other parts of the system via API calls and
callbacks. To complement API traces with contextual information, RiskMon uses
meta information on application markets such as ratings, number of downloads and
category which provide a quantitative representation of applications’ reputation and
intended core functionalities. The baseline learner combines a user’s coarse expecta-
tions and aggregated intelligence of her trusted applications to generate a training
set. Afterwards, the baseline learner applies a machine-learned ranking algorithm to
learn a risk assessment baseline. Then the risk meter measures how much an ap-
plication’s behaviors deviate from the baseline. Using the deviation to provide risk
information, the risk meter ranks a user’s installed applications by their cumulative
risks and presents the ranking to the user intuitively.
5.2.1 Application Intelligence Aggregator
This component aggregates intelligences about a user’s installed applications, in-
cluding their runtime behaviors and contextual information. As RiskMon monitors
runtime behaviors by interposing Binder IPC, we propose a set of features for API
traces tailored to the peculiarity of Binder. Also, we seek contextual information from
application markets and propose corresponding features to represent and characterize
them. The proposed features build a space of application intelligences and enables
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Figure 5.1: Proposed Risk Assessment Framework
subsequent baseline generation and risk measurement. Unless explicitly specified, all
features are normalized to [0,1] so that each of them contributes proportionally.
Features for API Traces
Android applications frequently use APIs to interact with system services. Consider-
ing that using most APIs does not require any permission, we assume that resources
protected by at least one permission are a user’s assets.
We are interested in runtime behaviors, i.e. Binder transactions, that are used by
APIs to reach the assets. However, APIs do not carry information about Binder trans-
actions. To bridge this gap, we adopt existing work [29, 58] to provide mappings from
permissions to APIs. Meanwhile, we analyzed the interface definitions of Android
system services and core libraries to generate a mapping from APIs to Binder trans-
actions. As a result, we extracted 1,003 permission-protected APIs, of which each
corresponds to a type of Binder transactions. Each type of Binder transaction is iden-
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tified by the corresponding system service, direction of control flow, and a command
code unique to the service. For example, an API named requestLocationUpdate is
identified as Binder IPC transaction (LocationManager, callback, 1).
We attempt to represent a Binder transaction with its internal properties and con-
tents. For a specific Binder transaction between an application and a system service,
we are interested in its type so as to identify the corresponding asset. Also we need to
know the direction of control flow for determining who initiates the transaction. As
users trust the system services more than applications, RiskMon should differenti-
ate Binder transactions initiated by applications and system services. Thus, internal
properties are represented with the following features:
• Type of Binder transaction: 1,003 boolean features as a bit array, where
one bit is set to 1 for the corresponding transaction type and others are 0; and
• Direction of control flow: another boolean feature: 0 for transactions ini-
tiated from applications (API calls), 1 for transactions initiated from system
services (API callbacks).
Note that we use 1,003 boolean features to represent the type of Binder transactions
instead of using one integer value. This is because Binder transactions are indepen-
dent from each other, and the Binder command codes are simply nominal values. By
using the array of 1,003 boolean values, the distances between any two Binder trans-
action types are set to the same value, which is important for our learning algorithm
(Section 8).
In terms of contents, parcels in Binder transactions are unstructured and highly
optimized, and it is hard to restore the original data objects without implementation
details of the sender and recipient. Therefore, we use length as one representative
feature of parcel. A motivating example is accesses on contacts. From the length of
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a parcel we can infer whether an application is reading a single entry or dumping the
entire contacts database. Thus, we propose the following two features for parcels:
• Length of received parcel: length of the parcel received by an application
in bytes; and
• Length of sent parcel: length of the parcel sent by an application in bytes.
Features for Meta Information
Although meta information on application markets cannot describe applications’ run-
time behaviors, it is still viable to use such information as contextual properties that
capture users’ and developers’ opinions and complement runtime behavior informa-
tion.
In terms of representing the opinions of users, we use the following features in
correspondence with their counterparts of meta information on application markets:
• Number of installs: a range of total number of installs since the first release
1 . We use logarithmic value of the lower bound, i.e., log(1+lower bound of
#installs);
• Number of reviews: a number of reviews written by unique users. We use
the logarithmic value, i.e. log(1+#reviews); and
• Rating score: a number indicating the user-rated quality of the application
ranged from 1.0 to 5.0.
These three features capture an application’s popularity and reputation. The first
two features are similar to number of views and comments in online social networks.
Recent studies [116] demonstrated that online social networks and crowd-sourcing
1Number of installs is specified with exponentially increasing ranges: 1+, 5+, . . . , 1K+, 5K+,
. . . , 1M+, 5M+.
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systems expose a long-tailed distribution. Therefore, we assume they follow the same
distribution and use the logarithmic values.
We emphasize that we do not attempt to extract risk signals from these features.
Instead, we adopt these features to capture the underlying patterns of a user’s trusted
applications as specified by the user and apply the patterns for the subsequent risk
assessment.
Next, we propose a feature to capture the developer’s opinion:
• Category: a tuple of two numerical values normalized to [-0.5, 0.5].
Google Play uses an application’s category to describe its core functionalities (e.g.
“Communication”). As of this writing, Google Play provides 27 category types. We
choose Self-Organizing Map (SOM) to give a 2-dimension representation of categories.
Barrera et al. [34] demonstrated that SOM can produce a 2-dimensional, discretized
representation of permissions requested by different categories of Android applica-
tions. Categories in which applications request similar permissions are clustered to-
gether. Therefore we use the x and y coordinates in the map to represent categories.
Figure 5.2 depicts the coordinates of 13 categories as an example. It is clear to see
that some categories bear underlying similarities, such as “Entertainment”, “Media
and Video” and “Music and Audio” in the center of the figure 2 .
Clearly an unscrupulous developer can claim an irrelevant category to disguise
an application’s intended core functionalities. However, a user can easily notice the
inconsistencies and remove such applications. In addition, falsifying an application’s
meta information violates the terms of application market’s developer policies and
may lead to immediate takedown.
2For more details on SOM, please refer to [34].
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Figure 5.2: SOM Representation of 13 Categories
Finally, based on the scheme defined by these features, the application intelligence
aggregator generates a dataset consisted of feature vectors extracted from API traces
and meta information of each installed application.
5.2.2 Baseline Learner
The baseline learner is the core module of RiskMon. It takes two types of inputs,
which are a user’s expectations and feature vectors extracted by the application in-
telligence aggregator. Then the baseline learner generates a risk assessment baseline
which is represented as a predictive model.
Acquiring Security Requirements
It is challenging for most users to express their security requirements accurately. We
aim to find an approach that could be mostly acceptable by users. Krosnick and
Alwin’s dual path model [84] demonstrated that a satisficing user would rely on
salient cues to make a decision. Based on this model we develop a simple heuristic:
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For a specific application, accesses on resources that are more irrelevant
of a user’s expected core functionalities incur more risks.
This heuristic captures a user’s expectations as security requirements by risk aver-
sion, which implies the reluctance of a user to use a functionality with an unknown
marginal utility [101]. For example, a user may consider that, microphone is necessary
to a VoIP application such as Skype. But location seems not because she does not
understand the underlying correlation between disclosing her location and making a
phone call. Thus, microphone is more relevant and less risky than location in her
perception.
Base on this, the risk learner asks a user to specify a relevancy level for each per-
mission group requested by her trusted applications. We choose permission groups to
represent resources because it is much easier for general users to learn 20+ permis-
sion groups than 140+ permissions. And recent usability studies demonstrated the
ineffectiveness of permissions due to limited comprehension [43, 62]. Although users
tend to overestimate the scope and risk of permission groups, they are more intuitive
and reduce warning fatigue [62].
The process for users to communicate their security requirements with RiskMon
is similar to a short questionnaire. Each permission group requested by a user’s
trusted applications corresponds to a five-point Likert item. The user specifies the
level of relevancy on a symmetric bipolar scale, namely relevant, probably relevant,
neutral, probably irrelevant or irrelevant. Figure 5.3 shows an example of relevancy
of permission groups for Facebook and Skype. Permission groups are represented by
self-descriptive icons, which are identical to those shown in Android Settings. CAMERA
preceding LOCATION for Facebook is possibly due to the user’s preference to photo
sharing compared to check-ins.
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Figure 5.3: An Example of Specifying Relevancy for Permission Groups
Note that the relevancy levels specified by users are subjective. With that said,
users’ biased perception of applications and resources may affect their specified rel-
evancy levels. From our user study, a user told us that PHONE CALLS is relevant to
Google Maps because he tapped a phone number shown in Google Map and then the
dialer appeared. Although the dialer rather than Google Map has the capability to
make phone calls, the baseline learner considers it as the security requirements for
inter-application communication.
We next formalize the problem of acquiring security requirements. PG = {pg1, pg2, · · · , pgm}
is a set of permission groups available in a mobile operating system. A = {a1, a2, · · · , an}
is a set of a user’s installed applications. TA is a set of a user’s trusted and installed
applications and TA ⊆ A. RequestedPG : A → 2PG is a function that maps an
application to its requested permission groups. A user’s security requirement Req is
a mapping Req : TA× PG→ R. R = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a set of relevancy levels, where
a larger value indicates higher relevancy and less risk and vice versa.
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Compiling Training Set
Next we describe how the baseline learner compiles a training set from the aggregated
application intelligences and user-specified relevancy levels. For brevity, we apply the
relevancy levels onto the feature vectors generated by the application intelligence
aggregator to generate a set of vectors annotated with relevancy levels.
To bridge the gap between permission groups and feature vectors, we extract
mappings of permission groups and permissions from the source code of Android.
Meanwhile, existing work has provided mappings between permissions and APIs [29,
58]. Therefore, we can assign the relevancy level on feature vectors because each
vector represents an API call or callback.
We formalize the problem of compiling a training set as follows. Algorithm 8
illustrates the process to compile the training set T .
• X is a space of features as defined by the scheme discussed in Section 5.2.1, X
= {~x1, ~x2, · · · , ~xl}, X ∈ R
i, where i denotes the number of features;
• DS = {Da1, Da2, · · · , Dam} is a collection of sets of feature vectors, where
Daj ⊆ X and Daj corresponds to an application aj;
• Apd : A × PG → DS is a function that maps an application and one of its
requested permission groups to a set of feature vectors; and
• T = {(~x1, r1), (~x2, r2), · · · , (~xn, rn)} is a training set consisted of annotated vec-
tors, rk ∈ R, ~xk ∈ X.
Generating Risk Assessment Baseline
Ranking Support Vector Machine (RSVM) [71, 81] is a pair-wise ranking method.
Generally it utilizes a regular Support Vector Machine (SVM) solver to classify the
order of pairs of objects. Next we explain how we apply RSVM to learn a risk
assessment baseline.
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Algorithm 1: Compiling Training Set
Data: DS, TA, Req
Result: T
1 T ← ∅;
2 for a ∈ TA do
3 pg ← RequestedPG(a); r ← Req(a, pg); D ← Apd(a, pg);
4 for ~x ∈ D do
5 add (~x, r) to T;
6 end
7 end
8 return T
We assume that a set of ranking functions f ∈ F exists and satisfies the following:
~xi ≺ ~xj ⇐⇒ f(~xi) < f(~xj), (5.1)
where ≺ denotes a preferential relationship of risks.
In the simplest form of RSVM, we assume that f is a linear function:
f~w(~x) = 〈~w, ~x〉, (5.2)
where ~w is a weight vector, and 〈·, ·〉 denotes inner product.
Combing (5.1) and (5.2), we have the following:
~xi ≺ ~xj ⇐⇒ 〈~w, ~xi − ~xj〉 < 0, (5.3)
Note that ~xi − ~xj is a new vector that expresses the relation ~xi ≺ ~xj between ~xi
and ~xj. Given the training set T , we create a new training set T
′ by assigning either
a positive label z = +1 or a negative label z = −1 to each pair (~xi, ~xj).
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(~xi, ~xj) : zi,j =


+1 if ri > rj
−1 if ri < rj
∀(~xi, ri), (~xj, rj) ∈ T
(5.4)
In order to select a ranking function f that fits the training set T ′, we construct
the SVM model to solve the following quadratic optimization problem:
minimize
~w
1
2
~w · ~w + C
∑
ξi,j
subject to ∀(~xi, ~xj) ∈ T
′ : zi,j〈~w, ~xi − ~xj〉 ≥ 1− ξi,j
∀i∀j : ξi,j > 0
(5.5)
Denoting ~w∗ as the weight vector generated by solving (5.5), we define the risk
scoring function f~w∗ , for assigning risk scores to the feature vectors in the application
intelligence dataset:
f~w∗ = 〈~w
∗, ~x〉 (5.6)
For any ~x ∈ X, the risk scoring function measures its projection onto ~w∗, or the
distance to a hyperplane whose normal vector is ~w∗. Thus, the hyperplane is indeed
the risk assessment baseline.
5.2.3 Risk Meter
Risk meter measures the risks incurred by each installed application including
those are trusted by the user. Note that (5.6) gives a signed distance. We use
the absolute value to represent the deviation and risk. The risks incurred by an
application ai are the cumulative risks of its runtime behaviors:
∑
~x∈Dai
|f~w∗(~x)| (5.7)
Another goal of the risk meter is to provide supporting evidences to end-users. To
this end, it presents the measured risks at three levels of granularities.
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Application: In the simplest form, the risk meter presents a ranking of installed
applications by their risks as a bar chart. The X axis indicates the applications and
the Y axis indicates the risks. A user can trust an application if it is less risky than
her trusted ones. In contrast, an application that is significantly risky can also draw a
user’s attention. Note that the risk meter does not provide any technical explanation
at this level.
Permission group: The ranking of applications may seem unconvincing some-
times for users. In such a case, the risk meter can provide risk composition by permis-
sion groups which is represented as a pie chart. The pie chart intuitively reveals the
proportion of the risks incurred by the core functionalities of an application. As users
have basic knowledge of permission groups when they specify security requirements,
they should be able to interpret the risk composition correctly.
API calls and callbacks: The evidences presented at this level are intended for
experienced security analysts who are familiar with the security mechanisms under
the hood of Android. This is the raw data generated by the risk scoring function.
An analyst can inspect values of features to reconstruct the semantic view of runtime
behaviors.
Moreover, RiskMon allows a user to establish and revise her security require-
ments iteratively. RiskMon may generate biased or unconvincing evidences as a
user may not have clear and accurate security requirements at the very beginning of
using RiskMon. Thus, a user can provide her feedback by adjusting her security
requirements and/or adding more trusted applications. RiskMon also periodically
updates the security assessment baseline for observed new runtime behaviors. All of
these enable RiskMon to approximate an optimum risk assessment baseline to help
users make better decisions.
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5.3 Automated Risk Mitigation
Based on the proposed risk assessment framework, we move one step further to
address risk mitigation. Specifically, we propose an automated decision process that
assists users to conveniently identify and revoke risky permissions from installed ap-
plications.
A typical permission framework, just like common access control systems, involves
decision processes that grant and revoke permissions. While permission granting
has been widely adopted in modern mobile platforms, permission revocation has
not received a commensurate popularity. For example, iOS users could not deny
accesses to their personal information until iOS 6. Google introduced App Ops as
an experimental privacy control framework in Android 4.3, but later disabled its
management interface in Android 4.4.2 [49].
Permission revocation is necessary because it enables complete and flexible control
over granted capabilities. To this end, recent work has proposed enhanced middleware
mandatory access control (MMAC) frameworks to support rule-driven permission
revocation on Android [35, 38, 91, 109, 129]. An obvious limitation of such frameworks
lies in the definition and maintenance of the rules [54], which place non-negligible
burden on general users. To say the least, it remains an open question whether users
can accurately cherry-pick the risky permissions that should indeed be revoked.
Intuitively, RiskMon could provide the necessary evidences to support a permis-
sion revocation decision process. However, Android by default only allows users to
mitigate unnecessary risks is removing risky applications. Such an arbitrary approach
may disrupt user experiences. For example, grey applications (e.g., ad-supported
games) are likely to request excessive permissions for harvesting user information.
Revoking all the granted permissions (i.e., removing application) seems unnecessary
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because some permissions are not major sources of risks and they may support func-
tionalities that a user needs. Our goal is to selectively revoke risky permissions
and mitigate future risks to a user’s expected level. Therefore, those grey applica-
tions might still retain necessary functionalities and users could stay protected from
privacy-infringing code.
We identify three key challenges in bridging the gap between risk assessment and
risk mitigation: (1) selecting reference applications; (2) estimating risk budgets;
and (3) enforcing decisions with minimal user intervention. Reference applications
implicitly provide a user’s expected runtime behaviors and upper bounds of acceptable
risks. Risk budgets quantitatively determine decision thresholds that line up with the
user’s risk mitigation strategies. Moreover, we need to minimize user intervention in
decision enforcement, because general users would be incapable and reluctant to create
and manage security policies. We next describe how we address these challenges.
5.3.1 Selecting Reference Applications
As we previously assumed, a user’s trusted applications define her expected ap-
propriate behaviors for similar applications. To select a set of reference applications
for a target application, we prefer trusted applications that are under the same or
close categories because their core functionalities tend to be similar. Therefore, we
assign coordinates to all the installed applications according to their categories in
the category SOM. Then, we select the reference applications by computing a set of
k-nearest trusted applications based on their Euclidean distances.
The best choice of k depends on the category SOM and the number of the trusted
applications. Here we adopt a conservative approach to avoid over-generalization that
could lead to over-estimation of risk budgets. First, we start from k ≤ ⌊log2|AT |⌋.
Meanwhile, we need to filter this set by removing applications that are not close
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Figure 5.4: An Example of Selecting Reference Applications from Close Categories
enough to the target application. To quantitatively define “close”, we compute the
smallest enclosing circle of the category SOM and its radius R, and choose R/2
as the threshold of close categories. In summary, a target application a’s reference
application set ARa is the intersection of the following sets:
1. ⌊log2|AT |⌋-nearest trusted applications; and
2. the trust applications whose Euclidean distance from a is no larger than r,
where r = R/2.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates an example of selecting reference applications for a social
application. The result is no more than ⌊log2|AT |⌋ applications under the “Social”,
“Communication”, and/or “Entertainment” categories.
Automated risk mitigation is also limited by the same problem of insufficient
trusted applications as automated risk assessment. ARa could be empty because AT
does not cover sufficient categories. In such a case, reselecting reference applications
is scheduled after a user adds trusted applications and improves coverage.
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5.3.2 Estimating Risk Budgets
Risk budgets define decision thresholds used in our automated decision process.
Our goal is to derive a risk budget for each permission of a target application from
its reference applications.
We next formalize the problem of estimating risk budgets for a target application
a as follows:
• P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} is a set of permissions available in a mobile operating
system;
• UsedP : A→ 2P is a function that maps an application to a set of permissions
whose usage patterns have been observed by RiskMon;
• PAR : P×A→ R is a function that maps a granted permission of an application
to its measured risk score; and
• BIa =
⋃
ta∈ARa UsedP (ta) is a set of permissions that are the budget items for
an application a.
We then introduce the following budget estimation functions to support different
risk mitigation strategies, where p ∈ UsedP (a), a ∈ A, a /∈ AT , ARa ⊂ AT :
Stricta(p) =


min
ta∈ARa
PAR(p, ta) if p ∈ BIa
0 if p /∈ BIa
Averagea(p) =


avg
ta∈ARa
PAR(p, ta) if p ∈ BIa
0 if p /∈ BIa
Relaxeda(p) =


max
ta∈ARa
PAR(p, ta) if p ∈ BIa
avg
ta∈AT
PAR(p, ta) if p /∈ BIa
(5.8)
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The strict function prefers the most privacy-preserving practices of the reference
applications. The average function attempts to reduce the risks below the average
practices. For the permissions not among the budget items, the strict and average
functions both opt for a zero tolerance strategy. In contrast, the relaxed function
allows such permissions but their incurred risks should not exceed the average of all
the trusted applications.
5.3.3 Generating and Enforcing Decisions
To generate a decision for a permission p of an application a, we compute its
cumulative risks as Riska(p) and apply a user-specified budget estimation function,
for example:
Decision(a, p) =


Keep if Riska(p) ≤ Stricta(p)
Revoke if Riska(p) > Stricta(p)
(5.9)
Note that an important criterion of our decision process is revoking by observed be-
haviors 3 .
Managing security policies for complex information systems has been a challenging
task. It is even harder for dynamic systems such as the Android middleware, whose
security policies have to confine various applications that rapidly update themselves.
Enforcing security decisions for such systems would be unrealistic for general users
because it consumes much user attention and leads to habituation [61]. This partially
implies why Android community has been careful with integrating user-oriented and
generic permission revocation [49].
We introduce automated policy generation to address this challenge. Specifically,
automated permission revocation and policy generation are activated after (1) a user
3Intuitively, dormant permissions do not incur any risks so we choose not to revoke them because
we have no observed evidence to prove that such permissions will be abused.
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installs or updates a new application; (2) a user updates her risk assessment baseline;
or (3) a pre-defined time period. Note that we do not attempt to implement our
own policy enforcement mechanisms. Instead, our framework could be easily adapted
to support new middleware MAC frameworks with an intuitive policy translation
module.
5.4 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we first discuss a proof-of-concept implementation of RiskMon.
Then, we present the results of our online user study followed by two case studies.
We conclude our evaluation with the usability and performance of our system.
5.4.1 Implementation and Experimental Setup
We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of RiskMon on the Android mobile
platform. In terms of continuous monitoring, we implemented a reference monitor
for Binder IPC by placing hooks inside the Binder userspace library. The hooks tap
into Binder transactions and log the parcels with zlog 4 which is a high-performance
logging library. In addition, we implemented automated risk assessment based on
SVMLight 5 and its built-in Gaussian radial basis function kernel.
We designed and conducted a user study to evaluate the practicality and usability
of RiskMon. We hand-picked 10 applications (Table 5.2) that were mostly down-
loaded from Google Play in their respective categories. We assumed that all the
participants trust them. Then we used participants’ security requirements for the 10
applications and their application intelligences to generate the baselines. We also ran-
domly selected 4 target applications from the Top Charts of Google Play to calculate
4https://github.com/HardySimpson/zlog
5http://svmlight.joachims.org/
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their risks based on the generated baselines, including: a) CNN App for Android
Phones (abbreviated as CNN); b) MXPlayer; c) Pandora Internet Radio (abbreviated
as Pandora); and d) Walmart. For both trusted (10) and target (4) applications,
we collected their one-day runtime behaviors on a Samsung Galaxy Nexus phone.
In addition, we developed a web-based system that acquires a participant’s security
requirements, feeds them to RiskMon and presents the results calculated by Risk-
Mon to the participant. A participant was first presented with a tutorial page that
explains how to specify relevancy levels as her security requirements. Then she was
required to set relevance levels for each permission group requested by each trusted
application after reading the application’s descriptions on Google Play. Afterwards,
RiskMon generated a risk assessment baseline for the participant based on her in-
puts and runtime behaviors of the 10 trusted applications. Then RiskMon applied
the baseline on each of the 14 applications, and displayed a bar chart that illustrates
a ranking of 14 applications by their measured cumulative risks. Finally, an exit sur-
vey was presented to collect the participant’s perceived usability of RiskMon. Our
study protocol was reviewed by our institution’s IRB. And we recruited participants
through university mailing lists and Amazon MTurk. 33 users participated in the
study and Table 5.1 lists the demographics of them.
5.4.2 Empirical Results
Security Requirements
From our user study shown in Table 5.2, we highlight the results of Chase Mobile
and Dropbox because they both request some ambiguous permission groups that are
hard to justify for users. Figure 5.5 demonstrates the average relevancy levels set by
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Table 5.1: Demographics of the Participants
Category # of users
Gender
Male 29 (87.9%)
Female 4 (12.1%)
Age
18-24 15 (45.5%)
25-34 16 (48.5%)
35-54 2 (6.1%)
Education
Graduated high school or equivalent 3 (9.1%)
Some college, no degree 6 (18.2%)
Associate degree 1 (3.0%)
Bachelor’s degree 11 (33.3%)
Post-graduate degree 12 (36.4%)
Table 5.2: Applications Assumed to be Trusted in the User Study
Application Category
AmazonMobile Shopping
BejeweledBlitz Game
ChaseMobile Finance
Dictionary.com Books & Reference
Dropbox Productivity
Google+ Social
GooglePlayMovies&TV Media & Video
Hangouts(replacesTalk) Communication
MoviesbyFlixster Entertainment
Yelp Travel & Local
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(a) Chase Mobile
(b) Dropbox
Figure 5.5: Average Relevancy Levels Specified by the Participants for Chase Mobile
and Dropbox
the participants for each permission group requested by Chase Mobile and Dropbox.
The error bars indicate the standard deviation.
Chase Mobile is a banking application with functionalities like depositing a check
by taking a picture and locating nearest branches. Apparently NETWORK is more
relevant than others as participants agree that Chase Mobile needs to access the
Internet. Even though Chase Mobile uses LOCATION to find nearby bank branches
and CAMERA to deposit checks, both LOCATION and CAMERA have lower relevancy levels
than NETWORK. We believe it is because some participants do not have the experiences
of using such functionalities, but the averages are still higher than neutral. We can
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also observe that SOCIAL INFO falls below “neutral”, showing participants’ concerns
of why Chase Mobile uses such information.
Dropbox is an online file storage and synchronization service. From its results, we
identified an interesting permission group, APP INFO, whose description in Android’s
official document is: group of permissions that are related to the other applications
installed on the system. This authoritative description does not provide any cue of
negative impacts, which leads to user confusion as we can see that APP INFO has
the largest standard deviation. STORAGE, SYNC SETTINGS and ACCOUNTS are all above
“probably relevant” possibly due to their self-descriptive names that are semantically
close to Dropbox’s core functionalities.
Moreover, we noticed that the participants tend to set higher relevancy levels
for self-descriptive permission groups, while they tend to be conservative for other
permission groups. We note that this does not affect RiskMon in acquiring a user’s
security requirements, because RiskMon captures the precedence of one permission
group over another. Thus, the least relevant permission group (e.g. SOCIAL INFO
of Chase Mobile) always gets the highest risk scores for both trusted and distrusted
applications.
Application Risk Ranking
Figure 5.6 illustrates the ranking of 14 applications by their average cumulative risk
scores as measured by 33 risk assessment baselines generated for the participants. We
can see that MXPlayer (2.55) and Walmart (12.72) fall within the trusted applica-
tions, while CNN (54.15) and Pandora (69.22) are ranked with highest risk scores.
Note that both Pandora and CNN are renowned applications developed by well-
trained developers. Seemingly, they should use sensitive information appropriately.
Hence, we verified them by manually dissecting their API traces. We found that
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Figure 5.6: Average Cumulative Risk Scores Measured by the Participants’ Risk
Assessment Baselines
they both stayed in the background and attempted to keep connected to remote
servers. To this end, they kept polling ConnectivityManager for a fine-grained state
of the current network connection. This is an unexpected practice for both privacy
and performance perspectives and the official Android documents suggest developers
register CONNECTIVITY CHANGE broadcasts 6 to get connectivity updates accordingly
instead of polling. On the contrary, Hangouts incurred almost imperceptible amount
of risks, although it has similar requirements for connectivity. Therefore, RiskMon
showed that even popular applications might use sensitive information in a way that
incurs potential risks for users.
5.4.3 Case Studies
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. Note that there is
no ground truth of user’s expected appropriate behaviors. Thus, we opt for two case
studies on two applications, SogouInput and PPS.TV. We specified the relevancy
levels for 10 trusted applications and generated a risk assessment baseline. Then, we
verified their identified risk composition with manual analysis.
SogouInput is an input method based on the pinyin method of romanization,
and PPS.TV is a video streaming application similar to its counterparts such as
6http://developer.android.com/training/monitoring-device-state/connectivity-
monitoring.html
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Hulu and Netflix. Both of them are feature-rich, free and have accumulated over
5,000,000 installs on Google Play. We note that PPS.TV and SogouInput request 22
and 29 permissions, respectively. The numbers of requested permissions make them
suspicious over-privileged or privacy-infringing applications.
The measured cumulative risk scores are 179.0 for SogouInput and 366.9 for
PPS.TV. Table 5.3 demonstrates the risk composition of SogouInput and PPS.TV by
their requested permission groups. First, the unusually large portion of PHONE CALLS
indicates significant use of capabilities related to making phone calls and reading
unique identifiers. We verified the corresponding API traces and revealed that it
attempted to read a user’s subscriber ID and device ID. Second and more notably,
SOCIAL INFO contributed 4.02% of the total risks incurred by SogouInput. We veri-
fied the corresponding API traces and found that SogouInput accessed the Contacts
app and received a parcel of 384 bytes. Usually an Android application queries the
contact application and receives only the entries a user picks, which is several bytes
long. On the contrary, SogouInput attempted to dump the whole contacts data repos-
itory. Similar to SogouInput, PPS.TV utilized permissions related to PHONE CALL. In
addition to reading a user’s device ID and subscriber ID, it also registered a callback
to receive events of call states. We note that this allows PPS.TV to read the number
of incoming calls.
The results leave much room for imagination: how come an input method and a
video streaming application need capabilities related to PHONE CALLS, LOCATION and
SOCIAL INFO? Possibly users get personalized services by disclosing these information.
However it comes with a price of privacy. RiskMon highlights the risks so that users
can weigh the benefit and relevant cost by themselves.
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Table 5.3: Risk Composition by Permission Groups of Applications in Case Studies
Application Permission Group Risk Score
SogouInput
LOCATION 5.6 (3.13%)
NETWORK 104.4 (58.29%)
PHONE CALLS 61.8 (34.56%)
SOCIAL INFO 7.2 (4.02%)
Total: 179.0 (100%)
PPS.TV
LOCATION 26.0 (7.09%)
NETWORK 108.3 (29.52%)
PHONE CALLS 232.6 (63.40%)
Total: 366.9 (100%)
Automated Risk Mitigation
Based on the measured risks of the 6 applications, we further applied our automated
risk mitigation approach. In particular, we used Figure 5.2 to guide our selection of
reference applications out of 10 trusted applications. Therefore, r = R/2 = 0.326 as
shown in Figure 5.4 and k was no more than 3. Afterwards, we chose the average
budget estimation function to reduce the incurred risks of the applications that are
below the average level of their respective reference applications. Table 5.4 shows the
revoked permissions and risk reduction of the assessed applications. In this table, we
have denoted the specific reason for each revoked permission. “(O)” indicates that
the revoked permission was used by one or more reference applications but exceeded
the threshold set by the budget estimation function. “(N)” means that the permission
was not used by any of the reference applications. Such permissions were also revoked
in our case studies due to the average function’s zero tolerance strategy.
The revoked permissions are lined up with the results as shown in Table 5.3. In
particular, READ CONTACTS and VIBRATE were revoked from SogouInput because they
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were used but not among the risk budget items. In contrast, none of permissions
related to LOCATION was revoked, implying that SogouInput used LOCATION in a
reasonable and conservative manner. 4 out of 5 revoked permissions of PPS.TV were
mitigated due to over-budget, demonstrating its notable tendency of abusing a user’s
information. Overall, these applications were confined to behave like their respective
reference trusted applications.
We enforced the generated decisions through AppOps, and the revoked permis-
sions did not break the core functionalities. However, we can not guarantee that
permission revocation does not significantly impair an application’s usability, for two
reasons. First, our framework does not directly enforce decisions. Graceful enforce-
ment of decisions by access control frameworks is still an open question that is be-
yond the scope of this chapter. Second, risky permissions are not always excessive.
Obviously, core functionalities would break if their abused permissions are revoked.
applications instead of using our granular permission revocation mechanism.
The results of the case studies leave room for further analysis. How come an input
method and a video streaming application need capabilities related to PHONE CALLS,
LOCATION and SOCIAL INFO? Why does Walmart need to continuously access users’
location? Possibly users could get personalized services through disclosing private
information. However, it comes with a price. RiskMon is a necessary step towards
highlighting and mitigating the excessive risks.
5.4.4 System Usability
The criteria for usability were split into three areas: likeability, simplicity and
risk perception. Likeability is a measure of a user’s basic opinion towards automated
risk assessment. This identifies whether users would like to accept the proposed
mechanism. Simplicity is a measure of how intuitive the concepts and procedures
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Table 5.4: Revoked Permissions of Applications in Case Studies
Application
Revoked Permissions
Risk Reduction(O): Over budget
(N): Not in budget
SogouInput
ACCESS NETWORK STATE (O)
169.5 (94.7%)
READ PHONE STATE (O)
READ CONTACTS (N)
VIBRATE (N)
PPS.TV
ACCESS LOCATION (O)
367.0 (99.8%)
ACCESS NETWORK STATE (O)
ACCESS WIFI STATE (O)
CHANGE WIFI STATE (N)
READ PHONE STATE (O)
Pandora ACCESS NETWORK STATE (O) 130.3 (98.5%)
CNN
ACCESS LOCATION (N)
128.5 (100.0%)ACCESS NETWORK STATE (O)
WAKE LOCK (N)
Walmart
ACCESS LOCATION (O)
56.6 (100.0%)
ACCESS NETWORK STATE (O)
MXPlayer 0.0 (0.0%)
are, which is useful in evaluating the burden placed on users. Risk perception is
a measure of a user’s perceived awareness of risks through risk assessment, which
evaluates how users interpret the risks as presented by RiskMon.
After using RiskMon, an exit survey was presented to collect users’ perceived
usability of RiskMon. In the survey we asked users questions on likeability (e.g.
“indicate how much you like using your trusted apps to set a baseline”), simplicity
(e.g. “do you agree that RiskMon requires less mental efforts in risk assessment”),
and risk perception (e.g. “do you feel the increased awareness of the risks of your
installed applications”). Questions were measured with a five-point Likert scale. A
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Table 5.5: Usability Evaluation Results
Metric Average Lower bound on 95% confidence interval
Likeability 0.811 0.797
Simplicity 0.674 0.645
Risk perception 0.758 0.751
Table 5.6: Microbenchmark Results
Benchmark Average (s) Standard Deviation (s)
Feature extraction 8.27 0.07
Baseline generation (10 apps) 289.56 235.88
Risk measurement (per app) 0.55 0.17
higher score indicates a positive opinion or agreement, while a lower score indicates
a negative one or disagreement. Then scores were adjusted to [0,1] for numerical
analysis.
We analyzed a 95% confidence interval for users’ answers. Specifically we are
interested in determining the average user’s minimum positive opinions. Hence, we
looked at the lower bound of the confidence interval. Table 5.5 shows that an average
user asserts 79.7% positively on likeability, 64.5% on simplicity and 75.1% on risk
perception. The results show usability of RiskMon with the above-average feedback.
5.4.5 System Overhead
To understand the performance overhead of RiskMon, we performed several
microbenchmarks. The experiments were performed on a Samsung Galaxy Nexus
phone with a 1.2GHz dual-core ARM CPU. The phone runs Android v4.2.2 and
RiskMon built on the same version. Table 5.6 shows the average results.
Feature extraction: The application intelligence aggregator extracted feature
vectors from the raw API traces of 33,368,458 IPC transactions generated by 14 ap-
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plications in one day. We measured the CPU-time used by parsing the API traces and
generating the feature vectors. The average time is 8.27 seconds, which is acceptable
on a resource-constrained mobile device.
Baseline generation: We ran baseline generation based on the input acquired
in the online user study. The processing time varies for different participants, while
the average time is approximately 289.56 seconds due to the computation complexity
of the radial basis function kernel of SVMLight.
Risk measurement: Applying the risk assessment baseline is much faster than
baseline generation. We measured the time taken to apply a risk assessment base-
line on 14 applications. The average time per application is 0.55 seconds, which is
imperceptible and demonstrates the feasibility of repeated risk assessment.
Finally, we anecdotally observed that it took 5-10 minutes for the participants
to set relevancy levels for 10 applications. This usability overhead is acceptable
compared to the lifetime of a risk assessment baseline.
5.5 Discussion
To capture actual risks incurred by applications used by a user, RiskMon fun-
damentally requires running them on the user’s device. We note that 48.5% of the
respondents in our user study claimed that they often test drive applications on their
devices. RiskMon itself does not detect or prevent sensitive data from leaving users’
devices. We would recommend users use on-device isolation mechanisms (e.g. Sam-
sung KNOX 7 ) or data shadowing (e.g. [76]). However, it is far from perfect for
running untrusted applications on trusted operating systems.
RiskMon requires users to specify security requirements through permission
groups. While most of the frequently requested permission groups are self-descriptive
7http://www.samsung.com/global/business/mobile/solution/security/samsung-knox
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(e.g. LOCATION and CAMERA), some are ambiguous (e.g. APP INFO) and contain low-
level APIs only known to developers. Although we identify permission groups as an
appropriate trade-off between granularity and usability, we admit that permission
groups are still a partial artifact in representing sensitive resources for users. Note
that we choose permission groups only to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach
of security requirement communication. As our future work, we plan to develop a sys-
tematic and intuitive taxonomy of sensitive resources on mobile devices to facilitate
more effective requirement communication. Moreover, generating a risk assessment
baseline is a compute-intensive task that does not quite fit resource-constrained mo-
bile devices. Thus, we plan to offload such a task to trusted third-parties or users’
public or private clouds in the future.
Regarding our current implementation of RiskMon, it does not address: (1) in-
teractions between third-party applications; and (2) interactions that do not utilize
Binder. This indeed illustrates potential attack vectors that can bypass RiskMon.
Unauthorized accesses on resources of third-party applications [42] might be possible
because such resources are not protected by system permissions. Also, two or more
malicious applications can collude via local sockets or covert channels and evade the
Binder-centric reference monitor in RiskMon. For our future work, we will extend
our framework to maximize the coverage of attack vectors in our approach.
5.6 Related Work
Analysis of meta information: Meta information available on application
markets provides general descriptions of applications. Recent work has proposed
techniques to distill risk signals from them. Kirin [56] provides a conservative certifi-
cation technique that enforces policies to mitigate applications with risky permission
combinations at install time. Sarma et al. [106] propose to analyze permissions along-
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side with application categories in two large application datasets. Peng et al. [99] use
probabilistic generative models to generate risk scoring schemes that assign compar-
ative risk scores on applications based on their requested permissions. In addition to
analysis on permissions, Chia et al. [41] and Chen et al. [40] performed large-scale
studies on application popularity, user ratings and external community ratings. In
particular, Pandita et al. proposed WHYPER [97] which automatically infers an ap-
plication’s necessary permissions from its description in natural languages. However,
meta information does not accurately describe the actual behaviors of applications.
RiskMon uses meta information to provide contextual information so as to comple-
ment the analysis on the runtime behaviors for risk assessment.
Static and dynamic analysis: Analysis on execution semantics of applica-
tions, such as static analysis of code and dynamic analysis of runtime behaviors, can
reveal how applications use sensitive information. Stowaway [58] extracts API calls
from a compiled Android application and reveals its least privilege set of permis-
sions. Enck et al. [55] developed a decompiler to uncover usage of phone identifiers
and locations. Pegasus [39] checks temporal properties of API calls and detects API
calls made without explicit user consent. TaintDroid [52] uses dynamic information
flow tracking to detect sensitive data leaking to the network. Regarding malware
analysis, DroidRanger [128] and RiskRanker [67] are systematic and comprehensive
approaches that combine both static and dynamic analysis to detect dangerous be-
haviors. DroidScope [121] reconstructs semantic views to collect detailed execution
traces of applications. These work focuses on fundamental challenges for assessing
actual risks incurred by applications. However, they do not provide a baseline to
capture the appropriate behaviors under diverse contexts of different applications.
Thus, their approaches are more intended for security analysts rather than end users.
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Mandatory access control frameworks: RiskMon includes a lightweight
reference monitor for Binder IPC. While it monitors IPC transactions for risk assess-
ment, several frameworks mediate IPC channels as part of their approaches to support
enhanced mandatory access control (MAC). SEAndroid [109] brings SELinux kernel-
level MAC to Android. It adds new hooks in the Binder device driver to address
Binder IPC. Quire [48] provides IPC provenance by propagating verifiable signatures
along IPC chains so as to mitigate confused deputy attacks. Aurasium [119] uses libc
interposition to efficiently monitor IPC transactions without modifying the Android
platform. FlaskDroid [38] provides flexible MAC on multiple layers, which is tailored
the peculiarity of the Android system. Along these lines, RiskMon captures Binder
transactions with a fine-grained scheme to facilitate risk assessment on applications’
runtime behaviors.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented RiskMon that continuously and automatically
measures risks incurred by a user’s installed applications. RiskMon has leveraged
machine-learned ranking to generate a risk assessment baseline from a user’s coarse
expectations and runtime behaviors of her trusted applications. Also we have de-
scribed a proof-of-concept implementation of RiskMon, along with the extensive
evaluation results of our approach.
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Chapter 6
FLOW-DRIVEN ASSESSMENT
As we have discussed our approach to assess individual apps, we argue that it
is equally important to assess the inter-application information flows. In this sec-
tion, we propose an approach to systematically check intent-based inter-application
communication among installed Android apps.
6.1 Problem Statement
Modern mobile operating systems have shifted into a security architecture that is
fundamentally different from those of traditional desktop OSs. Mobile applications
(commonly referred to as apps) run as unique security principles; they are isolated
in their respective sandboxes and receive few privileges. In addition, the mobile OSs
support inter-application communication that enables interoperability among apps
so that multiple apps can collaborate to accomplish complex tasks. For example,
an email client exports a picture file to a photo editor; the photo editor modifies
the picture and posts it online through a social network client. Inter-application
communication respects the Unix philosophy of “do one thing and do it well” and
promotes modular design in apps.
A type of messaging objects called intents build a major and sophisticated inter-
application communication mechanism in Android [42]. Intents are flexible as they
can carry simple data and even inter-process communication primitives (e.g. Binder [23]
and file descriptors [24]). Moreover, the intent attributes are rich with Android
middleware semantics, which naturally facilitate access control decisions [37, 95].
Intent-based inter-application communication has received much research attention.
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In general, two aspects are covered: previously unknown security limitations of in-
tents [35, 42, 48, 60, 87] and generic policy-driven security extensions that remedy the
limitations [30, 35–37, 73, 90, 91, 93, 95, 109, 129]. However, there is an overlooked
gap between configuring generic security extensions and securing a specific Android
device. Every app, every device, and every user are different. A policy analyst needs
insights into the policies before she can accurately define how the apps in her device
communicate through intents in her intended ways. To bridge the gap, we seek a
systematic approach for a policy analyst to conveniently acquire such insights.
Defining and verifying the policy for each individual security extension that con-
trols intent-based communication is a complex task for a policy analyst. The recent
emerging security requirements, such as “bring your own device” (BYOD), call for
fine-grained and precise policies. For example, a single mobile device may host a doc-
tor’s personal apps and the apps of several clinics. The doctor and the clinics would
require that the deployed security policies accurately enforce the boundaries between
the apps of the respective stakeholders. Meanwhile, mitigating existing threats related
to intents such as communication hijacking [42], confused deputy attacks [35, 60], and
accidental data disclosure [90] requires the that policies are tailored to the peculiari-
ties of each threat and each vulnerable app.
However, unlike the other inter-application communication mechanisms in An-
droid, which are usually controlled by a single security extension, intent-based com-
munication is mediated by multiple security extensions. While multiple security ex-
tensions promote the flexibility of controlling intent-based communication, they also
introduce new challenges in definition and verification of their policies.
C-1: Incompatible policies. The security extensions define their own incompatible
schemas and semantics. For example, FlaskDroid [37] inherits SELinux’s policy se-
mantics of type enforcement. Saint [95] uses an XACML-like schema customized by
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the authors. IntentFirewall’s policy is unique and unlike the other security extensions,
however it specifies a critical set of tests on intent attributes. As far as we know, no
existing policy checker can work with every extension’s policy. Therefore, checking
such incompatible policies remain a manual process that requires a policy analyst to
master the details of every security extension.
C-2: Distributed policies. The security extensions store policies in distributed loca-
tions. For example, IntentFirewall stores its policy in an XML file, and intent filters
are stored in internal data structures inside AMS and PMS. In addition, each exten-
sion tends to make the policy exclusively accessible to itself. In other words, each
security extension makes its decision by itself and is not aware of the other secu-
rity extensions. Consequently, no security extension possesses a holistic view of the
reachability among installed apps as controlled by all the security extensions.
C-3: Dynamic policies. The security extensions may allow apps to specify and mod-
ify policies at run-time. For example, app-defined intent filters and permissions are
prevalent in Android. Recent security extensions that implement decentralized in-
formation flow control (DIFC) also encourage apps to participate in policy manage-
ment [90]. Thus, the policies continuously change as a user installs, removes, or
upgrades the apps on her device. This requires proactive verification to guarantee
that the dynamically changing policies comply with the security requirements.
To address the challenges in checking intent-base communication, we seek to build:
a) a general policy checker that easily adapts to the policy schema of any security
extension that controls intents; b) a holistic policy checker that aggregates the policies
into a holistic and verifiable view; and c) a proactive policy checker that automatically
acquires the live states of security extensions as snapshots of dynamic policies. With
the policy checker, we attempt to systematically answer the following two questions
regardless of specific security extensions, apps, or devices: a) what intents can an
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app send to a specific app; and b) what intents can an app receive from a specific
app. Meanwhile, we expect the checker to be mostly automated so as to reduce the
burden on policy analysts.
Suppose we have a mission-critical app that signs sensitive treatment plans. Find-
ing out which apps can send intents to this signer app assists a policy analyst to deter-
mine the domain of authorized apps and to rule out untrusted apps that may exploit
the signer’s potential vulnerabilities (e.g. capability leaks [66]). Similarly, finding out
the signer’s reachable apps is necessary for preventing accidental disclosure [90] or
deliberate data theft where a user shares the treatment plans with untrusted apps
such as a cloud storage client. In addition, knowing exactly what intents an app
can send and receive enables fine-grained policies and furthers the notion of domain
isolation. For example, a domain can be defined as a set of apps, a set of incoming
intents, and a set of outgoing intents. According to Chin et al. [42], two domains that
do not share incoming intents are safe from intent eavesdropping attacks; two do-
mains that do not share outgoing intents are safe from spoofing attacks. Pushing the
level of domain granularity from apps to intents also pushes the level of detail beyond
the comprehension of a human analyst. Our policy checker implements automated
analysis to verify that the system-wide intent-based communication is configured as
intended.
6.2 Intent Space Analysis: Model
We believe that creating the right abstraction model is the first step toward check-
ing intent-based communication. In this section, we elaborate the intent space model
that lays the foundation for intent space analysis.
107
6.2.1 Overview
We observe a few common characteristics after analyzing the existing security ex-
tensions that mediate intent-based communication. First, all the security extensions
implement policy-driven mandatory access control. Second, these security extensions
allow or deny an intent if the values of the intent’s attributes match their policies.
Third, they are cascaded in a chain; one security extension allows an intent by passing
it to the next security extension. Based on these observations, we find that intent-
based communication is analogous to a computer network: each app is an endpoint,
an intent is a packet, and the security extensions behave like a chain of routers whose
rules specify how they forward intents based on their “header” attributes. Inspired
by packet header space analysis [83], we propose to model each security extension’s
inputs or outputs as a geometric intent space over intent attributes; and further we
model each security extension’s intent forwarding functionalities as a transfer func-
tion.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates a motivating example where App A sends intents to
App B. For simplicity of the example, we consider only actions and categories, and
we represent the actions on the x-axis and the categories on the y-axis. The initial
space of App A is full in both dimensions because an app can create arbitrary intents
before the intents are processed by any security extension. And because the security
extensions only forward the intents that match certain actions or categories specified
in their policies, the space gradually shrinks as the transformations T1, T2, and T3 are
applied to the initial space (Figure 6.1 (a)). The remaining space at App B indicates
the intents that App A can send to reach App B. And if no space remains, App A
cannot communicate with App B through intents. One step further, we combine the
transfer functions into a composite transfer function that describes app-to-app space
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Figure 6.1: (a) The intent space shrinks as it passes security extensions, modeled
here by the T1, T2, T3. (b) Composing transfer functions to model app-to-app trans-
formation.
transformation as illustrated in Figure 6.1 (b). This composite function captures all
the security extensions. Thus, it describes the holistic intent forwarding state that
we need for checking intent-based communication.
6.2.2 Intent Space
Formally, an intent space is a K-dimensional space of regular languages defined
as I = {.∗}K , where “.*” is the regular language that describes all words. The
K dimensions correspond to K intent attributes, which are selected by the policy
analyst based on her requirements. A policy analyst can set a smaller K if the
security extensions to be analyzed do not inspect every intent attribute. An intent
i maps to a point in the space, such as: {action: SEND,category: DEFAULT} 1 for
K = 2. Multiple intents map to a subspace defined as a hypercube or a union of
multiple hypercubes. A hypercube is represented with exactly K regular languages
at K dimensions, such as {action: SEND|SEND MULTI, category: ε (the empty string
1For clarity in this example we annotate the dimensions with the attributes.
109
language)}. Any hypercube with fewer than K dimensions or undefined dimensions
is invalid and considered as an empty space ∅ in the subsequent computations.
6.2.3 Intent Space Algebra
Algorithms that check intent-based communication between two apps must deter-
mine whether an app’s allowed outgoing intents overlap with the other apps’ allowed
incoming intents. To this end, we define the basic set operations on I: intersection,
union, complementation, and difference. Note that a point in I can be considered as
a special hypercube whose regular languages contain only one word; and a subspace
is a union of multiple hypercubes. We therefore define set operations for hypercubes
and carry over the operations to other intent space objects. Throughout the rest of
this chapter, we overload the term intent space to refer to all types of intent space
objects including points, hypercubes, subspaces, as well as the entire intent space.
Intersection. The intersection of two intent spaces is computed by intersecting
the regular languages at each dimension. Formally, given two intent spaces i, j ⊂ I
and their dimension set D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}, their intersection i∩ j is {d1 : regex
i
1
∩
regexj1, . . . , dk : regex
i
k ∩ regex
j
k}. For example, {A[12], C1} ∩ {ε, C1} is equivalent
to {A[12], C1} and {A[12], C1} ∩ {A3, C1} is equivalent to {∅, C1}. Note that {∅,
C1} is missing a dimension and thus is considered as an empty space ∅.
Union. A union of intent spaces may not be simplified to a single intent space.
For example, the union of two intent spaces {A1|A2, C1} and {A3, .*} cannot be
represented by any single hypercube and we simply represent the union as {A1|A2,
C1} ∪ {A3, .*}. We can simplify the result if the intent spaces are on the same
hyperplane. For example, {A1|A2, C1} ∪ {A3, C1} is equivalent to {A[1-3], C1}.
Complementation. The complement of an intent space i is the union of all the
intent spaces that do not intersect with i. Recall that the intersection of two intent
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spaces is an empty space if the intersection is missing any of the K dimensions. We
compute i’s complement i with Algorithm 8, which finds all non-intersecting intent
spaces by replacing the regular language at one dimension with its complement if
the language is not .* and setting .* at the other dimensions. For example, the
complement of {ε} is {.*} and the complement of {A1, C1} is {A1, .*} ∪ {.*, C1}.
Algorithm 2: Computing an intent space’s complement
Data: i
Result: i
1 i′ ← ∅;
2 for dimension di ∈ D do
3 L← regular language at di;
4 if L 6= .∗ then
5 i′ ← i′ ∪ {d1 : .∗, . . . , di : L, . . . , dk : .∗};
6 end
7 end
8 return i′
Difference: The difference (or subtraction) is computed with intersection and
complementation, i.e., i−j = i∩j. For example, {A1|A2, .*} - {A2, .*} is equivalent
to {A1|A2, .*} ∩ {A2, .*}, which is {A1, .*}. A slightly more complicated example
which reuses the complement of {A1, C1} is shown below:
{A1|A2, C1|C2} − {A1, C1}
= {A1|A2, C1|C2} ∩ {A1, C1}
= {A1|A2, C1|C2} ∩ ({A1, .*} ∪ {.*, C1})
= {A2, C1|C2} ∪ {A1|A2, C2}
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6.2.4 Transfer Function
For convenience of analysis, we assume that all security extensions deny by de-
fault. For those security extensions that accept by default, it is trivial to reduce
them into deny-by-default extensions with a least-priority rule that accepts every-
thing. Therefore, apps cannot communicate if the security extensions specify no rule.
Conversely, the rules of a security extension that allow/deny some intents from one
app to another app essentially specify how the security extension forwards or drops
intents from the source app to the destination app. As we represent intents as an
intent space, we model a security extension’s intent forwarding and dropping func-
tionality as intent space transformation and represent a security extension with a
transfer function. Given that the space of all apps is A, a transfer function T is
formally defined as:
T : (a, i)→ 2A×I , a ∈ A, i ⊂ I
To aggregate multiple transfer functions into a holistic view, we iteratively apply
each (a, i) tuple of the output of a transfer function to the input of the next transfer
function and build a composite transfer function.
A transfer function captures the transformation that a security extension performs
on A, I, or both. Suppose we are to model a simple security extension that works
like a Layer-2 network switch: it only supports coarse-grained control over which app
can send intents to another app regardless of intent attributes. Such an extension
can be modeled as a transfer function that transforms only on A. IntentFirewall
denies an app from sending a specific intent regardless of the intent’s destination
apps. It therefore can be modeled as a transfer function that only transforms on I.
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Figure 6.2: IntentScope System Workflow.
We elaborate more details about how we model security extensions for intent space
analysis in the subsequent section.
6.3 Intent Space Analysis: System
In this section, we describe our policy analysis framework IntentScope which
supports intent space analysis. To demonstrate its generality, we also discuss how
IntentScope works with the AOSP security extensions and their policies. We em-
phasize that IntentScope is not limited to only the discussed security extensions
in this chapter.
6.3.1 System Workflows
Figure 6.2 depicts the workflow of IntentScope. In general, IntentScope
starts from acquiring the policies of security extensions, then creates transfer func-
tions, and converts the composite transfer function into a holistic reachability graph
for subsequent analysis.
Acquiring Policies
The policy of a security extension is often referred to as a dedicated file stored in the
filesystem. In this work, we opt for a more general definition of policy and propose to
acquire all the states and configurations of security extensions so long as they specify
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how the intents are forwarded. To this end, we create a privileged watchdog app for
IntentScope that proactively observes policy changes and automatically takes a
snapshot of the policies. The implementation of the watchdog app is largely specific
to the analyzed security extensions. For example, intent filters are registered by apps
and maintained by AMS and PMS. The watchdog app may acquire the registered
intents filters on an Android device by dumping the internal states of AMS and PMS
after an app registers/unregisters any intent filter.
Creating Transfer Functions
Next, we map the acquired policies onto transfer functions. Given that a security
extension makes decisions based on its loaded policy and implemented policy in-
terpretation logic, a transfer function that models the intent forwarding state must
capture both. While the policy can be automatically retrieved by IntentScope’s
watchdog app, the policy interpretation logic still requires manual effort to model.
IntentScope requires a policy analyst or the security extension’s authors to define
a transfer function for its policy interpretation logic and to create a policy parser
that instantiates the corresponding transfer function. Note that this logic construc-
tion overhead is only performed once as the defined transfer functions can be reused
and the parsers can automatically instantiate transfer functions. We elaborate our
transfer functions for the AOSP security extensions in Section 6.3.2.
Building a Holistic Reachability Graph
To facilitate analysis and visualization, we propose to convert the composite transfer
function into a directed graph that represents inter-application reachability. Formally,
a holistic reachability graph is denoted as G = (V,E), where V is a set of vertices that
correspond to the installed apps and E is a set of edges that correspond to the intent
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spaces that an app can send to reach another app. Constructing such a reachability
graph is straight forward. Each app maps to a vertex in the graph. For each app,
we apply the composite transfer function on its initial intent space (e.g., {.∗}K) and
add a directed edge if any non-empty intent space remains at the destination app.
We assign the remaining intent spaces on the edges as their weights, which allows
IntentScope to support flexible queries and graph pruning as a policy analyst adds
constraints on the graph.
6.3.2 Transfer Functions for AOSP Security Extensions
Intent filters, IntentFirewall, protected broadcasts, and permissions are the inte-
gral parts of AOSP and therefore widely deployed in COTS Android devices. They
also serve as reference implementations for other security extensions. For example,
Apex [91] and CRePe [44] extend the permissions; and SEAndroid controls intents
with a slightly modified IntentFirewall [25]. Based on these observations, we believe
that the AOSP security extensions are a good starting point to demonstrate that
IntentScope is general, because it can effectively work with their policies. In the
remainder of this section, we share our experiences of modeling these security exten-
sions for intent space analysis. Although we are not the first to formally model them,
we provide the most accurate models by covering a complete set of intent attributes
and undocumented logic in the security extensions. Unless stated otherwise, the con-
tents in this section are based on our manual analysis of the kitkat-release branch
in AOSP.
As shown on the left side of Figure 6.2, two chains of security extensions control
implicit and explicit intents. We define two intent spaces: (1) II as a six-dimensional
implicit intent space over five intent attributes action, category, scheme, authority,
type and one additional attribute permission; and (2) IE as a two-dimensional ex-
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plicit intent space over component name and permission. Note that the permission
of an intent is inherited from the app that created the intent. The chain for implicit
intents consists of four security extensions: protected broadcasts, IntentFirewall, in-
tent filters, and permissions; and we define their transfer functions over II as T
I
PB,
T IIFW , T
I
IF , and T
I
PERM . The chain for explicit intents includes two security exten-
sions: IntentFirewall and permissions; and we define their transfer functions over IE
as TEIFW and T
E
PERM .
Intent Filters: T IIF
An intent filter specifies the implicit intents that it allows to be forwarded to the
next security extension. Therefore, an intent filter’s output is the intersection of
the input intent space and the intent filter’s corresponding intent space. Suppose
a component dst.c in an app dst has an intent filter filter that describes an intent
space idst.cfilter. Then, an intent filter transforms (src, i) to (dst, i∩ i
dst.c
filter). Note that the
transformation is performed on both A and I. Given the installed apps on a device
as a set A, we combine their registered intent filters and define TIF as follows:
T IIF (m, i) = {(n, i ∩ i
n.c
filter)|i ∩ i
n.c
filter 6= ∅,
∀c is a component of n,∀n ∈ A, n 6= m,
i, in.cfilter ⊂ II}
Next we explain how we map an intent filter to its intent space ifilter. In general,
an intent filter accepts an intent if the intent’s attributes pass a series of tests on
the intent filter’s attributes. Therefore, we reduce the problem of modeling an intent
filter to constructing a set of regular languages which consists of the words that pass
each respective test.
Action Test: An intent passes the action test if the intent’s action matches any
action in the intent filter. Therefore, we map the one or more actions of an intent filter
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onto a regular expression that concatenates the escaped action strings and separates
them with the vertical bar character |, such as VIEW|EDIT. There are two corner cases
in this test. First, zero action in a filter fails the test. Second, zero action in an implicit
intent also fails the test. We capture both cases with a regular expression [], which
denotes an empty language whose intersection with any language is empty. Note that
the Android documentation is incorrect with respect to the second corner case: “if
an intent does not specify an action, it will pass the test as long as the filter contains
at least one action”. The reason is that queryIntent() in the IntentResolver class
eventually denies such intents even though matchAction() in the IntentFilter class
allows. Our experiments also confirm this behavior. Interested readers are referred
to the source code 2 for more details.
Scheme Test: An intent passes the scheme test if the intent’s scheme matches
any scheme in the filter. Therefore, the regular expression here is constructed in the
same way as the action test, e.g., http|gopher. This test also has unique cases. First,
an intent filter without any scheme still matches three schemes: content, file, or an
empty string. We represent them with a regular expression file|content|, where
the last | matches the empty string. Second, an intent without any scheme passes
the scheme test only if the intent filter does not specify any scheme. We consider
such intents as intent spaces whose scheme is an empty string.
Authority Test: This test is dependent on the scheme test. If the intent filter
does not specify any scheme, this test automatically passes regardless of the authority.
This test also passes if the filter does not specify any authority. Thus, we use .* to
match any authority in these two cases. An intent without any authority passes the
test only if the filter has no authority. We represent such intents with an empty
2https://goo.gl/A1auU5 and https://goo.gl/cdzxg8
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string at the authority dimension. Otherwise, an intent passes the authority test if
its authority matches any authority in the filter.
Type Test: An intent passes the type test if the intent’s MIME type matches
any type in the filter. The challenge here is the wildcard character * in MIME type
strings. For example, * and */* match any type; and audio/* matches any subtype
of audio. To maintain the semantics of the wildcard character, we convert * and */*
to .*. The slash character / is a special character in regular expressions so we escape
it as \/. For example, audio\/.*|video\/mp4 represents every audio subtype and a
single video type. Moreover, an intent filter that has no type accepts only the intents
that have no type. Therefore, zero type in either the intent or the filter maps to an
empty string.
Category Test: Unlike the other attributes, an intent can include more than one
category. An intent passes the category test if every category in the intent matches
a category in the filter, i.e., the intent’s category set is the subset of the filter’s
category set. To capture this logic, we construct a regular language for an intent
filter’s categories with three steps: (1) escape the category strings; (2) concatenate
the escaped strings and separate them with |; and (3) surround the concatenated
string with ( and )*. For example, the subsets of an intent filter’s category set
{DEFAULT, LAUNCHER, BROWSABLE} are represented with a single regular expression
(DEFAULT|LAUNCHER|BROWSABLE)*. This expression also matches zero category and
duplicate categories specified in an intent. The other corner cases are similar to those
of the type test. No specification of category in an intent or a filter maps to an empty
string. An intent filter with no category accepts only the intents with no category.
Intent filters do not transform on the permission dimension. The regular language
at the permission dimension of all ifilter intent spaces is .*.
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IntentFirewall: T IIFW and T
E
IFW
IntentFirewall is a policy-driven MAC framework that block apps from sending spe-
cific intents. The policy files, located at /data/system/ifw/*.xml, specify a list of
firewall filters (fwfilters for short) that describe the implicit or explicit intents to be
blocked for a specific sender app. We model IntentFirewall as a transformation over
II or IE that subtracts the intent space of each fwfilter from the input intent space.
Suppose a fwfilter that blocks an app src is represented with an intent space isrcfwfilter.
T IIFW and T
E
IFW are defined in the same way as follows:
T IIFW (a, i) = {(a, i−
⋃
iafwfilter)|i−
⋃
iafwfilter 6= ∅,
∀fwfilter that blocks the sender app a,
i, iafwfilter ⊂ II}
TEIFW (a, i) = {(a, i−
⋃
iafwfilter)|i−
⋃
iafwfilter 6= ∅,
∀fwfilter that blocks the sender app a,
i, iafwfilter ⊂ IE}
Next we explain how we construct the intent space ifwfilter for a fwfilter over the
implicit intent space II and the explicit intent space IE, respectively. In general, we
construct ifwfilter according to IntentFirewall’s two-phase intent attribute matching
process.
If a fwfilter is for implicit intents, IntentFirewall first considers the fwfilter as
an intent filter and tests the intent attributes with the same tests as we discussed
in Section 6.3.2. We skip modeling this phase for brevity. In the second phase,
IntentFirewall tests the intent attributes with common string tests, such as isEqual,
isStartsWith, isContained, and matchRegex. Therefore, we model these tests with
their equivalent regular expressions. For example, isStartsWith=abc maps to a
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regular expression abc.*; isContained=def maps to a regular expression .*def.*.
The tests can be aggregated by computing the intersection of the regular expressions.
For example, two tests isEqual=abc and isStartsWith=ab map to abc.
For a fwfilter that filters explicit intents, we also construct its intent space in two
phases. In the first phase, IntentFirewall checks if an explicit intent’s component
name matches the one specified in the fwfilter. Thus, we simply copy the fwfilter’s
escaped component name to the corresponding dimension in ifwfilter. There are two
corner cases to be handled. An explicit intent with no component name is dropped
immediately because it resolves to nowhere. A fwfilter with no component name does
not block any explicit intent. We model the former case with a regular expression []
and model the latter case with a regular expression .*. In the second phase, Intent
Firewall tests the intent’s component name with the identical string tests so we do
not rephrase how we model them. Finally, both T IIFW and T
E
IFW do not transform
an intent space at the permission dimension because IntentFirewall does not inspect
permissions.
Note that IntentFirewall is a relatively new security extension in AOSP with no
official documentation and limited comments in the code. At first we referred to the
unofficial documentation maintained by Yagemann [120] to define the transfer func-
tions. However, we found unexplained behaviors of IntentFirewall when we tested
IntentFirewall’s sample policies, which led us to the discovery of the overlooked sec-
ond matching phase. In order to obtain an accurate and comprehensive model, we
manually derived the transfer functions presented in this section from IntentFirewall’s
source code 3 .
3https://goo.gl/e4zzxL
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Permissions: T IPERM and T
E
PERM
Permissions constrain an app’s capability to receive intents from other apps. Suppose
an app has a sensitive component that only accepts the intents from authorized
apps. Then, the app can define a permission and assign it to the component, which
requires the component’s callers to hold the exact same permission. If we treat
intents as if they inherit the permissions of their creator/sender apps, a permission’s
role is to forward only the intents that have matching permissions. Therefore, a
permission’s output is the intersection of the input intent space and the permission’s
own intent space. Note that permissions do not transform on A because the other
security extensions have already resolved the destination app/component. Suppose
a component dst.c is protected by a permission p described by an intent space idst.cc.p .
The transformation is defined as (dst.c, i)→ (dst.c, i ∩ idst.cc.p ).
We define T IPERM and T
E
PERM as follows:
T IPERM(a, i) = {(a.c, i ∩ i
a.c
c.p)|i ∩ i
a.c
c.p 6= ∅,
∀c is a component of a,
c is protected by c.p,
i, ia.cc.p ⊂ II}
TEPERM(a, i) = {(a.c, i ∩ i
a.c
c.p)|i ∩ i
a.c
c.p 6= ∅,
∀c is a component of a,
c is protected by c.p
i, ia.cc.p ⊂ IE}
Mapping a permission to an intent space ip is straight-forward. The regular language
at the permission dimension of ip is the escaped permission string. A special case
is that a content provider may have separate permissions for reading and writing.
Similar to the action test in intent filters, we model this case with a regular expression
121
perm r|perm w, based on the fact that an app with either the read or write permission
can access the content provider. The regular languages at the other dimensions are
.*, leaving the intent space unchanged at these dimensions.
Protected Broadcasts: T IPB
Protected broadcasts are a set of implicit intents with special actions that only the
apps whose UIDs are SYSTEM, BLUETOOTH, PHONE, or SHELL can send. The other
apps are prevented from sending such intents. Similar to IntentFirewall, we model
protected broadcasts as a space transformation that subtracts the intent spaces of
protected broadcasts from the input intent space if the input app is not a system-
app. Suppose each protected broadcast maps to an intent space iprotected. Then, we
define the transfer function for protected broadcasts as follows:
T IPB(a, i) =


(a, i) if a is an allowed app
(a, i−
⋃
iprotected) otherwise
i, iprotected ⊂ II
A list of actions used by protected broadcasts is available in the Android SDK
4 . Thus, we build an intent space iprotected for each action by assigning the escaped
action string into the action dimension of the space. The other dimensions do not
involve space transformation and remain with a regular expression .*.
Composite Transfer Function
As we have defined the transfer function for each individual security extension, we
combine them together to build the composite transfer function. The composite
function covers two chains of transfer functions for the implicit and explicit intent
4ANDROID_SDK_ROOT/platforms/android-19/data/broadcast_actions.txt
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space, respectively. To build each chain of transfer functions, we start from integrating
the transfer functions of those security extensions that restrict an app from sending
intents. Then, the transfer functions of the security extensions that restrict an app
from receiving intents follow. For the transfer functions defined in this section, their
composite transfer function T is defined as:
T (a, i) =


T IPERM(T
I
IF (T
I
IFW (T
I
PB(a, i)))) if i ⊂ II
TEPERM(T
E
IFW (a, i)) if i ⊂ IE
6.4 Evaluation
In this section, we first discuss a prototype implementation of IntentScope. We
then present the experiments in which we apply IntentScope to check intent-based
communication mediated by the AOSP security extensions installed in commodity
Android devices and customized Android OSs. We conclude with an evaluation of
the throughput of our system.
6.4.1 Implementation
IntentScope includes an implementation of the intent space model, a watchdog
app that acquires the policies of the AOSP security extensions that control intents, a
set of policy parsers that build and compose transfer functions, and a graph builder
that converts the composite transfer function into the holistic reachability graph.
The intent space model is built on Augeas Libfa [18], a native library that sup-
ports accurate and fast operations on regular expressions. In particular, we opt for
Hopcroft’s DFA minimization algorithm [75] to minimize regular expressions. This
algorithm runs in O(nlogn) time in the worst case, where n is the number of states of
a regular expression’s equivalent DFA. The watchdog app runs as a privileged system
123
Table 6.1: Evaluated Android Devices/OSs and Generated Reachability Graphs
Device OS |V|
|EI| Global Clustering Standard
|EE| Coefficient Deviation
1 Samsung Galaxy Note II Customized Android 311
880,456 0.986 0.007
979,993 0.994 0.006
2
LGE Nexus 4
Stock Android 108
155,369 0.971 0.014
138,651 0.990 0.009
3 MIUI v5 104
99,170 0.979 0.013
118,707 0.991 0.009
4 CyanogenMod 11 M12 85
38,606 0.974 0.015
47,458 0.989 0.011
Table 6.2: Apps Ranked by PageRank
Highest in GI Lowest in GI Highest in GE Lowest in GE
1
com.viber.voip com.android.proxyhandler com.android.contacts com.sec.enterprise.permissions
com.android.contacts com.monotype.android.font.cooljazz com.android.phone com.samsung.android.mdm
com.android.settings com.sec.android.provider.badge com.android.settings com.samung.android.sdk.spenv10
2
com.google.android.apps.plus com.android.dreams.basic com.google.android.setupwizard com.android.dreams.basic
com.android.settings com.android.providers.userdictionary com.google.android.apps.plus com.android.wallpaper
com.google.android.apps.gms com.android.vpndialogs com.android.settings com.google.android.apps.docs.editors.slides
3
com.android.mms com.android.pacprocessor com.android.email cm.android.printspooler
com.android.contacts com.android.sharedstoragebackup com.android.mms com.android.nfc
com.android.settings com.miui.providers.weather com.android.settings com.android.noisefield
4
com.android.gallery3d com.android.nfc com.android.contacts com.android.nfc
com.android.email com.android.backupconfirm com.android.email com.android.incallui
com.android.contacts com.android.sharedstoragebackup com.android.settings com.android.printspooler
app. It dumps the internal states of PMS and AMS to acquire a comprehensive list
of intent filters and permissions, regardless of whether they are statically declared in
apps’ manifest or dynamically registered in app’s code. The watchdog app also fetches
the relevant files where IntentFirewall and protected broadcasts store their policies.
While IntentScope does not seek to be a realtime checker, policy re-acquisition
occurs periodically and after app installs/uninstalls. As the operations over intent
spaces are both computation and memory intensive, the parsers and graph builder
run on a PC rather than on the mobile device where the watchdog app runs.
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6.4.2 Experimental Setup
We evaluated IntentScope on two Android devices and four Android-based OSs,
as shown in Table 6.1. The Galaxy Note ran Samsung’s deeply customized Android
(4.4.2), which pre-installed a large number of Samsung’s apps. In addition, we loaded
it with the top 50 apps from a list [22] of most downloaded Android apps in the
Google Play marketplace. The Nexus 4 ran three OSs, including stock Android (5.0),
MIUI (4.4.2), and CyanogenMod (4.4.4). We kept them as they were and did not
install additional apps. In particular, the first two OSs pre-installed a few proprietary
Google-branded apps. MIUI and CyanogenMod did not include these apps due to
licensing restrictions.
For each OS, we started each installed app and kept it in the foreground for at least
30 seconds. We assume that the apps had requested AMS and PMS to dynamically
register any intent filters or permissions. Then we applied IntentScope to generate
a reachability graph G and two subgraphs GI and GE that respectively represent the
holistic forwarding state of implicit and explicit intents. Each vertex represents an
app identified by its package name rather than UID 5 . Parallel edges are allowed and
prevalent in the graphs to capture the multiple entry points of an app.
6.4.3 Graph Overview
Table 6.1 lists the number of vertices, the number of edges (including parallel
edges), and the global clustering coefficient (measured without parallel edges) of each
GI and GE. A global clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which vertices
in a graph tend to cluster together, defined as:
5Apps with the same UID are considered as separate apps but share the permissions of one
another [33].
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Cglobal =
3× number of triangles
number of connected triples of vertices
We opted for this measure to get a general idea about how freely the installed apps
on a mobile OS are allowed to communicate with one another. As the clustering
coefficient of a clique is 1, the measured values of CG indicate that the vertices in
all the graphs are densely connected, which is in line with our observation that most
apps have at least one component (the main activity) exposed to other apps. The
large number of edges also imply the complexities of managing fine-grained policies
for intent-based communication.
Given the large number of apps/vertices and edges, prioritizing the apps that
expose larger attack surfaces is critical for efficiency in policy management. Therefore,
we propose to identify such apps with PageRank [96]. The underlying intuition is
that such apps are more likely to be accessed by other apps and thus have more
incoming edges, and the apps that have direct incoming edges from such apps are
also likely to be attacked. Table 6.2 lists the apps in the four mobile OSs with the
highest and lowest rankings. Most of the listed apps are in line with intuition, such as
com.android.settings and com.android.email. Here we discuss two apps which
are displayed in bold in Table 6.2. The app com.google.android.setupwizard is
highly ranked because it exports 69 components that can be accessed with explicit
intents. The app com.viber.voip is highly ranked because of its 94 intent filters
that expose the components to implicit intents.
6.4.4 Experiments
IntentScope answers the questions: what intents can an app send and receive?
Given the holistic reachability graph generated by IntentScope, checking what in-
tents an app can send is equivalent to checking the vertex’s outgoing edges as well
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as the intent spaces assigned on them. Conversely, checking what intents an app
can receive is equivalent to checking the incoming edges. In addition, IntentScope
supports flexible queries backed by regular expressions. Next we elaborate four ex-
periments in which we leverage the insights provided by IntentScope to identify
potential vulnerabilities due to errors in security policies of the AOSP security exten-
sions.
Zero Permission 6= Zero Privilege
Enforcing least privilege is a common practice in mobile security. While recent
work [44, 91, 115] attempts to control and minimize the set of an app’s granted
permissions, we are interested in another question: what can an app do if it has no
permissions. In this experiment, we created and installed such a zero-permission app.
We then checked what components this app can reach with its allowed intents. This
experiment helps a policy analyst reveal the exposed components that could possibly
be exploited by even a zero-permission app. If any sensitive components are exposed,
the details of the allowed intents that reach these components provide the necessary
knowledge for a policy analyst to create precise policies that protect them.
We find that zero permission does not necessarily mean zero privilege as users
might expect. Table 6.3 shows the number of the zero-permission app’s reachable apps
(i.e. out-neighbors) and its local clustering coefficient. A local clustering coefficient
measures the degree to which a vertex and its neighbors tend to cluster:
Clocal(v) =
number of edges among v′s neighbors
number of possible edges among v′s neighbors
The flexible queries supported by IntentScope also allow a policy analyst to
pinpoint the intents that have interesting semantics. In the Galaxy Note, we found
that this zero-permission app can send implicit intents that contain an interesting
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Table 6.3: Reachability of a Zero-Permission App
1 2 3 4
#Outgoing edges 2,767 3,072 1,443 1,280 955 1,142 454 557
#Reachable apps 241 263 77 92 79 90 62 72
Loal clustering coefficient 0.943 0.968 0.905 0.960 0.927 0.968 0.914 0.961
scheme called android secret code. For example, one of the reachable apps is
com.sec.android.app.wlantest, which accepts intents with an action android.
provider.Telephony.SECRET CODE, an authority of 526, and a scheme of android
secret code. Another reachable app com.wssyncmldm is a sensitive app that can
silently download and install apps. Therefore, an app with no permissions could ex-
ploit a vulnerability in this app in order to download and install apps, thus escalating
the privilege of the zero-permission app without exploiting the underlying OS. Due
to time constraints, we did not discover any exploitable vulnerabilities. Yet a recent
attack [98] demonstrates the feasibility of taking over an app with a malformed intent.
Fine-grained Domain Isolation
Chin et al. [42] presents a limitation of intent-based communication. Suppose a
malicious app Mallory attempts to attack a legitimate and sensitive app Alice and
existing policies prevent their direct communication. The limitation allows Mallory
to eavesdrop the intents from Alice to Bob and allows Mallory to send spoofed intents
to Alice. This situation calls for a fine-grained domain isolation model that not only
considers apps but also includes intents. IntentScope is useful in this scenario
because it provides insights about intents.
Specifically, two apps are not isolated with respect to eavesdropping attacks if
they share in-neighbors and incoming intents in the reachability graph. They are
not isolated with respect to spoofing attacks if they share out-neighbors and outgoing
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intents. Based on this observation, IntentScope guarantees intent isolation between
two apps if: (1) the apps are not neighbors of each other; and (2) the intent spaces of
their incoming edges from common in-neighbors do not intersect; and (3) the intent
spaces of their outgoing edges to common out-neighbors do not intersect.
As a case study, we checked the intent isolation between two apps in the Galaxy
Note: com.android.externalstorage and com.fmm.dm. The former is an Android
system app. The latter is believed to be bloatware as reported on several online fo-
rums. Figure 6.3(a) depicts their 8 common in-neighbors. IntentScope reported
that the intent spaces do not intersect, which implies that no app steals any intent
from the other. However, these two apps share 242 common out-neighbors and the in-
tersection of the intent spaces is not empty. Therefore, these apps are still susceptible
to spoofing attacks.
Enumerating Multi-app Workflows
In modern mobile operating systems, it is common for a user to orchestrate multiple
apps for a large and user-defined task. For example, a user may streamline a workflow
of downloading, viewing, editing, and sending a picture with a chain of apps. Under
the hood of Android, a multi-app workflow is implemented as a calling sequence
of intents. While controlling such workflows has been well covered by Nadkarni and
Enck [90], enumerating possible workflows would facilitate defining appropriate policy
for Aquifer [90] and similar access control systems.
In this experiment, we applied IntentScope to enumerate the workflows in
MIUI that match the aforementioned example. Specifically, we started from an app
com.android.providers.downloads, which manages downloaded files. We then per-
formed a breath-first search on the reachability graph for a sequence of implicit intents
as follows:
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1. action=android.intent.action.VIEW, scheme=content,
category=android.intent.category.BROWSABLE;
2. action=android.intent.action.EDIT, type=image/*;
3. action=android.intent.action.SEND, type=image/*.
Figure 6.3(b) shows the matching workflows that start from the cyan node. The
grey nodes are the first hop; the purple nodes in the middle are the second hop. Note
that the purple nodes also serve as the first hop because the photo editors can also
handle the VIEW action. The yellow nodes represent the last hop where data may
leave a mobile device via emails, Bluetooth, or MMS messages.
Table 6.4: System Throughput
|EI| Avg. Time (s) StdDev (s) # edges/sec |EE| Avg. Time (s) StdDev (s) # edges/sec
1 800,456 302.05 5.73 2,915 979,993 115.57 2.02 8,454
2 155,369 70.08 3.02 2,217 138,651 21.59 0.74 6,422
3 99,170 38.69 0.92 2,563 118,707 16.92 1.02 7,014
4 38,606 15.63 1.00 2,469 47,458 6.77 0.45 7,013
Average 2,541 7,225
Discovering Permission Re-Delegation Paths
An unprivileged app without permissions can delegate a privileged app with the
permissions to perform sensitive tasks [60]. Existing research [35, 60] detects and
mitigates permission re-delegation between two apps at runtime when they commu-
nicate. While mitigation at runtime is one solution, we expect to enable a policy
analyst to be aware of potential permission re-delegation paths before apps may ex-
ecute. Meanwhile, the intents used along re-delegation paths provide semantics for
the policy analyst to make informed decisions and take precise actions against the
privileged apps that could be abused.
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com.sec.android.AutoPreconfig
com.android.phone
com.sec.android.app.DataCreate
com.sec.android.Preconfig
com.sec.dsm.phone
com.samsung.sec.android.application.csc
com.android.providers.telephony
com.android.stk
(a) Common In-neighbors of Two Target Apps
com.jeejen.family
com.android.fileexplorer
com.android.email
com.android.contacts
com.android.providers.downloads com.miui.notes
com.android.bluetooth
com.miui.player
com.tencent.mm
com.android.mms
(b) Workflows for Processing a Picture
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(*)
(6)
(3)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(1)
(1)
com.antivirus
com.pandora.android
com.tencent.mm
com.surpax.ledflashlight.panel
com.shazam.androidme.pou.app
com.viber.voip
com.vlingo.midas
(c) Potentially Colluding Apps (k=3)
Figure 6.3: Experimental Results
We propose to use connected subgraphs to represent permission re-delegation paths
in a reachability graph. A subgraph is connected if every pair of its vertices has a path
that consists of only the vertices in the subgraph. This is analogous to the situation
where multiple apps collude but cannot relay their communication via other apps.
We define the problem of discovering re-delegation paths as follows: given a set of
critical permissions denoted as CP , find all the connected subgraphs of k vertices
that satisfy:
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• Each app (vertex) holds at least one permission but not all the permissions in
CP .
• The union of the apps’ permissions is a superset of CP .
The best algorithm we found to generate connected subgraphs of k vertices is
ConSubG(G, k) [82], whose worst-case time complexity is exponential in k. The
performance of this algorithm is generally acceptable because we rarely encounter
cases where more than five apps collude.
We targeted the 50 third-party apps installed on the Galaxy Note and set k = 3.
The critical permission set included three permissions: BLUETOOTH ADMIN, NFC, and
FLASHLIGHT, all of which are for accessing hardware devices that may significantly
affect battery life. Figure 6.3(c) demonstrates 6 groups of apps (triangles) that can
possibly collude to cover the critical permissions. In particular, the two apps in the
center respectively hold FLASHLIGHT and NFC, while the surrounding six apps hold
BLUETOOTH ADMIN.
Even though the discovered eight apps are mostly downloaded and seem to be
trusted by general users, they may carry third-party libraries or vulnerable compo-
nents that are exploitable by other apps. In other words, they may not deliberately
collude, but could be exploited by other apps to acquire privileges. The analysis
discussed in this experiment can be combined with the other analyses (e.g. zero-
permission apps) to further generate knowledge for a policy analyst to take precau-
tions before real exploits occur.
6.4.5 System Throughput
To understand the performance of IntentScope, we performed a microbench-
mark to evaluate the number of edges that IntentScope can check in a second.
Given that checking an edge is done by testing whether the intersection of the edge’s
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intent space and a given intent space is empty, this benchmark also implies the
throughput of IntentScope in terms of processing intent spaces. In the bench-
mark, we used the following two intent spaces to evaluate the throughput of implicit
intents and explicit intents, respectively. Note that the intersection of an implicit
intent space and an explicit intent space is always empty and thus not evaluated.
• iI : action=android\.intent\.action\.EDIT,
category=android\.intent\.category\.DEFAULT,
scheme=http, authority=\d+, type=mpeg,
permission=.*;
• iE: component=com\.sec\..*, permission=.*.
We performed the benchmark in a Xen VM running Ubuntu 14.04 with Intel Xeon
E5620 2.4GHz and 8GB of RAM. Only one core was used during the benchmark.
Table 6.4 shows the average results of 10 runs. It took approximately 5 minutes to
check the customized Android OS of the Galaxy Note loaded with 311 apps, and less
than 1 minute to check the others. In general, the processing time is proportional to
the number of edges. As shown in Table 6.4, IntentScope processed 2,541 implicit
intent spaces and 7,225 explicit intent spaces in a second. While explicit intent spaces
were almost three times faster than implicit intent spaces, we note that an explicit
intent spaces has only two dimensions and an implicit intent space has six dimensions.
6.5 Discussion
Policy analysis and app analysis. In terms of providing insights for configuring
security extensions, our intent space based policy analysis complements existing static
and dynamic app analysis. We make this argument based on the fact that an app’s
runtime behaviors on a specific mobile device are shaped by (1) the app whose code
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specifies its executional semantics; and (2) the security extensions whose policies
specify how the app’s specific behaviors are restricted. While we admit that app
analysis is indispensable, we also note the alarming trend of malware thwarting app
analysis. For example, code obfuscation and encryption hide an app’s true semantics
from static analysis. “Split personalities” in apps [32, 80] make malware appear
innocent by detecting and evading dynamic analysis tools. To get an upper hand
against adversaries, we would need policy analysis to orchestrate security extensions
for an additional line of defense.
Generality of intent space analysis. While we presented intent space analysis
for checking intent-based communication, the underlying methodology is beyond the
scope of intents and generally applicable to other security extensions. A promising
target is SE Android [109], which controls almost every inter-application communi-
cation mechanism other than intent-based communication. Specifically, it checks an
attribute called security context when an app requests to access files, sockets and so
on. Given that security contexts and intent attributes are essentially access control la-
bels [50], we foresee that our intent space analysis can be extended to a “context space
analysis” for SE Android. For our future work, we will extend our framework to rea-
son about SE Android policies and further maximize the coverage of inter-application
communication.
Usability of the holistic reachability graph. As we focused on developing
the intent space model and implementing a prototype of IntentScope, usability of
the reachability graph was not the primary goal. While the current graph already
supports network analysis and flexible queries as shown in the evaluation, we believe
that the usability of the graph has a lot of space to improve and indeed this is an
exciting area to explore. For example, the proper visualization can assist a security
analyst in understanding the inter-application communication and in ultimately de-
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veloping a robust security policy. Parallel processing on the graph can be introduced
to further speed up queries.
6.6 Related Work
Static and dynamic app analysis. App-oriented analysis provides insights for
a policy analyst to create appropriate security policies. ComDroid [42] and CHEX [87]
statically vet apps for the components that are vulnerable to intent-based attacks.
Woodpecker [66] employs an inter-procedural static analysis to discover similar vul-
nerabilities but specific to stock apps created by device vendors. Epicc [92], Aman-
Droid [114], FlowDroid [27], and DroidSafe [65] statically discover information flows
that potentially leak sensitive data. Beyond static analysis, dynamic runtime solu-
tions reveal how apps communicate through intents in real time. IPC Inspection [60]
automatically reduces an intent sender’s effective permissions to mitigate unautho-
rized privilege escalations. QUIRE [48] provides provenance of intents so that a callee
can track down the original caller. XManDroid [35] maintains a system-centric call
graph for the intents that have been sent and received. TaintDroid [53] and Vet-
Droid [123] track sensitive data shared among apps, regardless of how the data is
shared though intents or other inter-application communication mechanisms. Along
these lines, our intent space analysis assists policy analysts by systematically analyz-
ing how security extensions confine apps’ behaviors.
Experimental security extensions for Android: Besides intent filters, per-
missions, and IntentFirewall covered in this work, previous research has proposed a
series of experimental security extensions for Android. Saint [95] and TISSA [129]
support policy-driven access control for intents. CRePe [44] and APEX [91] enable
context-aware and fine-grained permissions. FlaskDroid [37] and SE Android [109]
are generic and flexible MAC systems that provide comprehensive protection on both
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Android’s middleware and kernel layers. Aquifer [90] enforces distributed information
flow control over intent-based UI workflows. Boxify [31] and DeepDroid [113] enforce
security policies on unmodified stock Android. Android Security Module (ASM) [73]
and Android Security Framework (ASF) [30] provide programmable interfaces that
promote the creation of customized security extensions. IntentScope facilitates
defining and verifying security policies for these security extensions. It is especially
useful for ASM and ASF that may host security extensions from multiple stakehold-
ers.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented intent space analysis for intent-based commu-
nication. Intent space analysis is based on an intent space model and a systematic
policy checking framework called IntentScope. The intent space model maps a se-
curity extension’s functionality of forwarding intents as transformation on a geometric
space. Based on the intent space model, IntentScope acquires the live states of
multiple security extensions and further derives a holistic view that supports formal
verification. Also we have described a prototype implementation, along with extensive
evaluation results of our approach.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 Contributions
Mobile apps may pose security and privacy threats to users. However, existing
defensive approaches largely rely on users to evaluate the security implications of
apps, but they are too complex for users to take actions. To remedy this situation,
we propose to empower users with insights and mechanisms that help them monitor,
assess, and confine apps. Toward this direction, we have demonstrated an automated
framework for systematically discovering heuristics that enable Android malware to
detect the presence of Android emulators. The results imply that some sensitive
information assets are overlooked by existing security mechanisms. As a solution,
we have proposed a multi-layer security framework that comprehensively and flexibly
monitors and confines apps. Based on this framework, we propose a risk management
framework that enables automated risk assessment and mitigation. We also propose a
holistic assessment framework to check intent-based inter-application communication
to discover potential data leakage and app collusion.
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